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"I have never viewed taxation as a means of rewarding one class of taxpayers
or punishing another. If such a point of view ever controls our public policy,
the traditions of freedom, justice and equality of opportunity, which are the
distinguishing characteristics of our American civilization, will have
disappeared and in their place we shall have class legislation with all its
attendant evils." Andrew Mellon (1924) 1
I. INTRODUCTION

The words written by Andrew Mellon more than 75 years ago represent
an idealistic view of the tax system. Despite the ideas expressed by Mr. Mellon,
it is difficult to devise a tax scheme that conforms to his standards. Our present
scheme of taxation is intended to promote vertical equity, which means that the
higher income taxpayer should pay a higher level of taxes based on an ability-topay concept. In theory, this objective is met by the progressive tax structure
imposed under the Code. 2 Arguably, a progressive tax system is inconsistent with
the principles expressed by Mellon because of the purported penalty levied
against high-income taxpayers in the form of inflated tax rates and the reward
bestowed on low-income taxpayers in the form of lower tax rates. In reality, a
progressive tax system does not reward or punish one class of taxpayers over
another, but it is necessary to ensure that taxpayers do not pay more tax dollars
to finance the government than they can afford. A progressive tax scheme is also
necessary to enable every taxpayer to retain sufficient income to live above the
poverty threshold. To the extent that a taxpayer lives below the poverty
threshold, that taxpayer should not be required to pay income taxes. The current
tax scheme is only partially successful in preventing taxpayers' after-tax income
from falling below the poverty threshold.
The graduated tax rates represent only a small component of the
progressive tax system. Progressivity is also established by techniques such as
the earned income tax credit, the income tax exemption, phase-out of deductions
for high-income taxpayers, corporate taxation and estate and gift taxation.
However, the effectiveness of these techniques has been limited in recent years
by Congressional acts. Newly proposed Congressional bills and the several
Presidential platforms result in further eradication of progressivity. Whether

1. Andrew Mellon, quoted in Sheldon D. Pollack, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy:
Revenue and Politics 243 (1996).
2. Presently, there are five marginal tax rates under the Code: 15%,28%,31%,36%
and 39.6%. IRC § 1. Married individuals filing joint returns, heads of households and
unmarried individuals are subject to the highest tax rate when their annual taxable incomes
exceed $250,000. Id. § l(a)-(c). Married individuals filing separate returns are subject to the
highest tax rate when their taxable incomes exceed $125,000. ld. § l(d).
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these proposals represented election year political rhetoric or serious tax
proposals, they generally provided substantial tax savings to the wealthy and
little benefit to lower income taxpayers. For example, President George W.
Bush's presidential platform included a substantial tax cut. Under this proposal,
52.6% of the tax cuts were geared toward taxpayers in the top 5% income level
while only II% would benefit taxpayers in the bottom 60% income level. 3 Prior
to withdrawing from the election. presidential candidate Senator John McCain
proposed tax cuts where 34.9% of the benefits would go to taxpayers whose
income was· in the top 5%. 4 Only 6.7% of the benefits would have gone to
taxpayers in the bottom 60% income level. 5 Major tax bills that had received
favorable votes from Congress resulted in the top 1% taxpayers receiving
average tax benefits 84 times that of the bottom 80% of taxpayers. 6
In light of these proposals and tax legislation that Congress has already
enacted, the oft-debated issue of whether progressive tax system is optimal needs
to be reconsidered. There has always been little agreement ainongst scholars on
whether the progressive tax system is fair or whether some other system, such as
proportional taxation or a consumption-based system is superior.7 In 1998,
Professors Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Alice G. Abreu wrote a law review
article critically analyzing empirical data on changes in the distribution in income
with total taxes paid between 1977 and 1990. 8 The empirical data supported a
finding that although the income of taxpayers in the top income percentile has
increased precipitously, their federal income tax burden has not increased
proportionately. 9 The article points out that the after-tax income oftaxpayers in
the top 10% has increased between 1977 and 1990, while it has decreased for all
other taxpayers. 10 This apparent trend that results in weakened progressivity has
continued throughout the 1990s. 11 Professors McMahon and Abreu further point

3. See Richard W. Stevenson, McCain to Propose Middle-Class Tax Cut and Private
Accounts Within Social Security, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,2000, at A23 (noting arguments from
independent analysts that McCain proposal would favor wealthy taxpayers).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. John D. McKinnon, White House Takes On GOP's Tax Cuts, Says They Favor Top
1%, Balloon Later, Wall St. J., July 18, 2000, at A24 (reporting Treasury contention that
Republican tax proposal overwhelmingly favored wealthy taxpayers).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 27-33.
8. Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 1 (1998) [hereinafter McMahon & Abreu] .
9. See id. at 7-8.
10. See id. at 19-20.
11. See Internal Revenue Service, 19 Stat. of Income BulL, Selected Historical &
Other Data, at 197 (Summer 1999) (illustrating that for tax years 1995 to 1997, lower income
taxpayers generally paid an increasing amount of their adjusted gross income in taxes, while
higher income taxpayers paid a decreasing amount of their adjusted gross income in taxes).

j

2001]

The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code

5

out that the increase is greater for t a x p a y e r s in the top 1%. 12 Congress has made
several amendments to the Code and created more progressivity between the
middle to upper income bracket and the wealthiest taxpayers through the use of
phase-outs. Specifically, Congress enacted the child tax credit, Roth IR.As,
education IR.As, and Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits. All of these tax
benefits are phased out based on a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. With the
exception of the child tax credit, these tax benefits primarily benefit the middle
to upper income taxpayer. Hence, Congress has made some inroad toward
protecting progressivity between the middle class and the upper class. 13
While it is apparent that most of the recently enacted tax benefits do not
benefit the wealthiest taxpayers, because of the use of phase-outs, they also do
not benefit the lower income taxpayers. One group of taxpayers that is
particularly affected by this problem is the low to middle class taxpayer.
Assume, for example, that a married couple has three children and adjusted gross
income of $35,000 during the year. The earned income credit is not available to
them because it is completely phased out for earned income levels above
$31,152. Assume also that the couple does not own their own home. In all
likelihood, they will not have sufficient deductions in order to itemize and hence
must claim the standard deduction. They are financially unable to invest money
in Roth or educational IR.As, even though those accounts are not subject to
taxation upon distribution, because they need to use their disposable income to
buy disposable diapers. Their "tax advisor" advised them to purchase stock
because the gain from the disposition is subject to tax rates of 10% if they hold
the stock for more than a year and 8% if they hold the stock for at least five
years. They informed the tax advisor that they could not afford to buy stock
because they needed to stock their cabinets with food and buy clothes instead.
Hence, the financial status of the low to middle income taxpayers precludes them
from capitalizing on the recently enacted tax incentives. While the primary
reasons for the recent enactments were to encourage saving and education,
Congress's decision to utilize phase-outs implies a secondary objective of
increasing progressivity. Because low to middle income taxpayers cannot take
advantage of these tax benefits, Congress's efforts, therefore, are unsuccessful.
Many of the lowest income taxpayers receive substantial benefit in the
form of the earned income tax credit. The middle class taxpayers are able to
12. McMahon & Abreu, supra note 8, at 19. The basic premise of the article was that
there were fundamental differences between the top 10% and top 1% in the distribution of
income and tax liability. Because of these differences, Professors McMahon and Abreu argued
that these taxpayers should not be categorized similarly and that the taxpayers in the top 5%
in general and the top 1% in particular should be subject to increased progressivity either in
the form of an increased rate schedule or through the use of phase-outs and floors . ld. at 77.
13. Congress has not increased the progressivity between the wealthy and the superwealthy as advocated by Professors McMahon and Abreu.
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exploit many tax incentives, including mortgage deductions, Roth IR.As and
educational IR.As. The wealthy benefit from the favorable capital gain tax rates.
This country's tax system has always been based upon a progressive structure.
Additional steps need to be taken to ensure progressivity between the lower to
middle income taxpayer and higher income taxpayers and to counter other tax
benefits provided to the higher income taxpayers that have resulted in a flatter
tax structure. Additional progressivity would also benefit low income taxpayers
that receive negligible earned income tax credits.
Part II of this article explores the methodology, constitutionality and
equity of progressive taxation. Part II also explores the history of graduated tax
rates and the constant fluctuations to establish the proper level of taxation. Part
III of the article outlines the failure of the current tax scheme in promoting a
progressive tax system. For example, if a wealthy taxpayer purchases a capital
asset after December 31, 2000, and holds on to the asset for five years, the
taxpayer is subject to a tax rate of 18% upon the disposition of the asset. Upon
a comparison of that rate with the 15% ordinary income rate for low income and
low to middle income taxpayers, the tax system fails to uphold the ability-to-pay
principle. Either the low income taxpayer's rate is too high or the high income
taxpayer's rate is too low. Part III also considers the impact of proposed
legislation, and explores the increased gap between the wealthy and the lower
income taxpayers created under the Code. Part IV of this article examines the
reasons supporting the continued maintenance of progressive taxation in today' s
society. This part will also address whether globalization dictates a retrenchment
from progressive taxation to protect this country from becoming less competitive
with other countries. Part IV will also address how the tax scheme should be
reformed to strengthen progressivity. This reformation is essential to reverse the
negative impact of tax provisions on women and minorities. This part concludes
with a proposal to reduce the lowest marginal brackets to ensure that most
taxpayers will benefit from the tax cut while adhering to the traditional ability-topay and progressive tax principles.

II. THE METHODOLOGY AND EQUITY OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION

A The Role of Fairness in Tax Policy and the Proper Measure of Taxation
Our system of income taxation purports to promote both horizontal and
vertical equity under the Code. Horizontal equity requires similarly situated
taxpayers to be treated similarly. 14 Vertical equity requires that taxpayers with
higher incomes pay income taxes at a higher level under an ability-to-pay

14. This article only addresses the vertical equity objective.
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concept. Under the ability-to-pay principle, those taxpayers with higher income
are presumed to be able to bear a greater share of the tax burdens. 15 The abilityto-pay principle has its genesis going as far back as the Income Tax Act of 1913,
where the legislative history states that "the tax upon incomes is levied according
to ability-to-pay. " 16 The fundamental underpinning for the vertical equity concept
is fairness. However, there is little agreement as to the true meaning of fairness
in tax policy. Professors Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka rely on definitions
of fairness found in dictionaries to define the term. 17 They define a fair income
tax as providing the equal treatment to taxpayers. 18 Professors Hall and
Rabushka do not believe that vertical equality has fared well because of partisan
politics. Specifically, they state:
Despite attempts to equalize after-tax income through steeply
graduated tax rates, one Congress after another has riddled the
tax code with hundreds of loopholes that permit some
millionaires to pay no income tax whatsoever and some high
earners to pay low taxes .... The reason is that every time tax
rates are increased, Congress, in response to political pressures
from organized interest groups, inserts new deductions and
loopholes into the tax code to offset the effects of higher rates.
The ideology of vertical equity, or ability-to-pay, runs smack
into the economic and political realities of economic distortions
and well-organized interests. 19
Economists have traditionally looked to two principles, the "benefit
principle" and the "ability-to-pay principle," in defining the meaning of a fair tax
system and allocating the country's tax burden.20 The benefit theory focused on
allocating tax burdens based on the governmental services provided to the
taxpayer. 21 Professor Graetz restated the oft-quoted definition of fairness under
the federal income tax laws as taxing similarly situated taxpayers similarly based
on an ability-to-pay concept. 22 Professor McMahon believes that the debates on
fairness of taxation have neglected to incorporate the traditional vertical and
horizontal equities and are instead being tied to "a disguised complaint" of the

15. Joel Slemrod, Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality 2 (1994).
16. See Robert M. Willan, Income Taxes: Concise History and Primer 139 (1994)
(reviewing legislative history surrounding 1913 Act).
17. Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax 25 (2d ed. 1995).
18. See id. at 26 .
19. See id. at 28.
20. See Slemrod, supra note 15, at 2.
21. Seeid.
22. Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax 11 (1997).

8

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 5:1

level of taxation 23 Professor Barbara Fried rejects the significance of all of these
definitions. She believes that no "sensible theory of distributive justice" should
focus on whether rate structures are fair or unfair because. the effectiveness of
rate structures stand or fall on how well they realize "moral commitments about
the proper role of government"24 Finally, some scholars consider a fair tax as
one that equalizes sacrifices and has its basis in the decreased utility of money.
Under this theory:
An equitable apportioning of sacrifice requires inflicting equal
hurt on each taxpayer. It seems likely that a dollar has less
"value" for a person with a million dollars of income than for a
person with only a thousand dollars of income. To take the
same number of dollars from each is not to require the same
amount of sacrifice from them. Instead a fair tax would take
more from the wealthier individual, and this is what a
progressive tax does. 25
Any definition of fairness must incorporate the ability-to-pay concept
because the most viable and equitable tax system is one that allocates the tax
burden based on the traditional ability-to-pay concept The benefit principle is
far too difficult to measure and results in a subjective evaluation of a multitude
of benefits and the inherent difficulty of establishing the proper weight that
should be afforded to each benefit. A strong argument exists for providing equal
treatment to all taxpayers. However, there is not a viable way to provide equal
tax trea1men to all taxpayers while creating a structure that generates revenue
and adhering to the ability-to-pay concept. Conversely, the progressive tax
system is fair because it implements the traditional ability-to-pay principle;
therefore, it represents an appropriate mechanism for allocating tax burdens.
Despite the progressive tax structure's adherence to the ability-to-pay
concept, it remains controversial and lacks consensus support. As such, there is
a divergence of scholarly opinions as to whether it is appropriate to subject
taxpayers to different tax rates. Some scholars advocate the use of proportional
taxation to allocate tax burdens. 26 Other scholars believe that the progressive tax

23. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 459,461 (1993).
24. Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Casefor Proportionate Taxation, 2 Chap. L. Rev.
157' 158 (1999).
25. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation
39-40 (1953). Professors Blum and Kalven did not support progressive taxation but simply
considered and rejected the arguments supporting progressive taxation.
26. See, e.g., Hall & Rabushka supra note 17, at 26 (arguing that no definition of
"fairness" establishes that a progressive tax system is fairer than a flat tax system); Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for
Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax Poly 221,225 (1995) (contending that "[t]o
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is the most equitable way to allocate the country's tax burdens. 27 Other scholars
reject both proportional and progressive taxation in favor of a consumptionbased tax system. 28 A consumption tax imposes taxes based on a taxpayer's
annual consumption One argument supporting the consumption tax originates
in the writings of Thomas Hobbes. 29 Hobbes believed that the consumption tax
was the fairest tax. He believed it was unfair that a taxpayer that worked as
diligently as another taxpayer, but chose to save his money rather than spend it
should be subjected to greater taxes. 30 Scholars supporting the consumption tax
share the Hobbesian vision that a fair tax should be not penalize savers. 31 They
also believe that the consumption tax is superior to other forms of taxation
because increased savings will stimulate national productivity 32 and simplify tax
administration 33 A broad-based consumption tax fits into two different
categories: 1) direct or personalized; or 2) indirect or impersonal.34 Indirect tax,
such as a retail sales tax or value-added tax, allows for businesses to simply add
the tax to goods and services sold. A direct tax would require an individual to

the extent that our society continues to adhere to certain traditional liberal principles, in that
it elevates the values of the autonomous individual and the equal status of each such individual
before the state, any system of taxation that differentiates among taxpayers ought to require
a compelling philosophic justification" and that no persuasive theory has been developed).
27. See, e.g., McMahon & Abreu, supra note 8, at 70 ("a progressive income tax can
help to preserve equality of opportunity for successive generations of Americans. . . by
reducing the disparities in after-tax income that dampen opportunity....");Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 608 (1996)
(noting that "an ideal flat income tax or an ideal consumption-based tax would be simpler and
more coherent than the current progressive tax; however, an ideal progressive tax would be
simpler as well.")
28. See, e.g., Richard L. Doemberg, A Workable Flat Rate Consumption Tax, 70
Iowa L. Rev. 425, 484 (1985) ("The flat rate consumption [tax] offers an impressively
straightforward reform of the current system").
29. Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 961,962
(1992).
30. See id. at 962 n.6.
31. See, e.g., William 0. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply
to Professor Warren, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (1975).
32. See Fried, supra note 29, at 962 (reviewing various proponents arguments in favor
of consumption tax). But see Thomas Michael Federico, Recent Congressional Consumption
Tax proposals: A Theoretical Inquiry Into their Effects on the Declining U.S. Saving Rate, 7
Fla. J. Law & Pub. Pol'y 337, 362 (1996) (opining that there is a lack of evidence supporting
increased savings under a consumption tax).
33. See Fried, supra note 29. But see Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax
Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. Rev .
151, 181, 193-209 (1997)(arguing that consumption taxes would not lessen complexity and
actually creates complexity in an attempt to achieve equity and raise revenue).
34. Charles E. McClure, Jr., The U.S. Debate on Consumption Based Taxes:
Implications for the Americas, 29 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 143, 148 (1998).
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complete a tax return using methods such as gross receipts or cash flow. 35 Under
the gross receipts method, taxpayers would total their spending amounts at yearend and the tax would be levied on the basis of that consumption A significant
drawback to implementing a consumption type tax is that it leads to regressive
taxation. There is a substantial body of scholarship addressing the inequities of
a consumption type tax. 36 Hence, despite the fact that the consumption tax has
several advantages over the present income tax scheme, it is inconsistent with the
traditional ability-to-pay principles. 37
Professors Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr. wrote an essay
critically examining the principles and justifications of progressive taxation more
than 40 years ago. 38 It continues to be one of the most comprehensive studies of
the progressive tax system. In their essay Professors Blum and Kalven correctly
pointed out that progressivity could be established under a single rate of taxation
by granting exemptions to all taxpayers. 39 According to Professors Blum and
Kalven. progressivity was inherent where exemptions were used 40 Hence, they
considered whether additional progressivity could be justified Professors Blum
and Kalven noted that exemptions were necessary to satisfy a "minimum
standard of living. "41 Professors Blum and Kalven presented their question for
consideration as " [o ]n what grounds is a progressive tax on all incomes over a
minimum subsistence exemption to be preferred to a proportionate tax on all
incomes over a minimum s u b s i s t e n c e e x e m p t i o n ? " 4 2 They also concluded without
explanation that "[i]t is so clear that no one today favors" a regressive tax

35. Constitutional concerns and the lack of simplification make the direct tax a less
popular alternative to the current income tax system. See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionmenl
of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?. 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334 (1997).
36. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 22, at 204 (stating that a consumption tax would not
promote the ability-to-pay concept because it would not tax income that was saved and a flatrate consumption tax would be regressive). One commentator states as follows:
[C)onsurnption taxes tend to be regressive, as compared to income taxes. Higher
income individuals spend a smaller percentage-of their income on consumption.
Higher income individuals have a higher percentage of their income from savings.
To achieve the same distribution of burden by income class, the rate structure of a
consumption tax must be more progressive than that of an income tax.
John S. Nolan, The Merit of an Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y
207,215 (1995).
37. See Paul, supra note 33, at 194.
38. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 25.
39. Id. at 4; see Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policy for the Post-Liberal Society: A
Flat Tax Inspired Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax,
58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 727 (advocating a personal exemption in conjunction with a flat tax to
ensure progressivity).
40. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 25, at 4.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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because "the term itself has become colored" and, therefore, it is not a serious
altemative. 43 Other scholars share Professors Blum's andKalven's position that
the country should not adopt a regressive tax system44 while other scholars are
not quite as dismissive. 45
B. The Constitutionality and Equity of Progressive Taxation
The constitutionality of progressive tax rates is long settled. 46 The
Supreme Court will invalidate a tax law as a violation of the Constitution where
it is:
* * * so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was
not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property, that
is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth Amendment, or,
what is equivalent thereto, was so wanting in basis for
classification as to produce such a gross and patent inequality
as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion.47
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of
progressive rates was in the context of the estate tax. In a case decided during
1900, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the War Revenue
Act of 1898 that had imposed a tax on legacies exceeding $10,000.48 The basis
of the constitutional attack was that the tax was void because it was not uniform
throughout the country as required under Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution. 49 The Court determined that the uniformity referred to geographical
uniformity rather than a "thought of restricting Congress to intrinsic
uniformity. "50 The Supreme Court recognized that some commentators and
economists supported progressive taxation because it was more "just and equal"

43. See id. at 3.
44. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:
ANew Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905, 1911 (1987) (noting wide support
for analysis and viewpoint expressed in work of Blum and Kalven).
45. See Schoenblum, supra note 26, at 244 ("Regressivity and equal, per capita
taxation necessarily have to be considered, because the same arguments that stymie
progressivity undermine the case for the fairness of proportionality.").
46. See Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115, 117-18 (1916); Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106-07
(1900); Ackerv. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568,575 (6th Cir. 1958), aff d, 361 U.S. 87 (1959).
47. John Douglas Messina v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 155, 160-61 (1973) (citing
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24-25).
48. See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 43.
49. Id. at 77. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution provides that, "duties, imposts and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1.
50. See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 102.
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than proportional taxation, but did not find it necessary to rely on that support. 51
Rather, the Court stated that in the absence of a constitutional limitation, the
issue of what was just and equal was a legislative question. 52 Hence, the Court
applied a deferential approach to the legislature and stated it would only use its
judicial power where the tax was arbitrary and confiscatory. 53
In 1916, the Supreme Court addressed whether the progressive tax
feature of the Income Tax Act of 1913 was arbitrary and unreasonable and
therefore a violation of due process. 54 Specifically, the Supreme Court considered
whether the progressive tax was unconstitutional because of the classification
based on wealth. 55 The Court noted that there was no express provision
prohibiting progressive taxation in the Constitution and held that the statutory
provision was not an arbitrary abuse of power. 56 The subsequent courts that have
addressed the issue summarily dismiss the constitutional attacks and simply rely
on the early Supreme Court decisions upholding progressive taxation. 57
C. Methods of Establishing Progressive Taxation
The progressive tax system is achieved in six primary ways: 1)
graduated tax rates; 58 2) the earned income credit; 59 3) income tax exemption for
low incomes; 4) phase-out of personal deductions for higher income taxpayers; 60
5) corporate taxation61 ; and 6) estate and gift taxes. 62 This section examines how
these tax features create progressive taxation.

51. See id. at 122.
52. See id. The Court also deferred to an earlier Supreme Court that addressed
whether the progressive rates in the Illinois inheritance tax violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Maguon v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank,
170 u.s. 283 (1898).
53. See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 122-23.
54. See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 9.
55. See id. at 21.
56. See id. at 24-25.
57. See,e.g.,Acker, 258 F.2dat575 (citing Knowlton andBrushaberforproposition
that constitutionality of progressive tax rates is a settled issue); Messina, 202 Ct. Cl. at 160-61
(stating that poor taxpayers are intentionally taxed at lower rates and this alone is insufficient
to result in a violation of the Constitution).
58. See IRC § 1.
59. See id. § 32.
60. See id. § 68.
61. See id. § 11.
62. See id. §§ 2001 & 2010.
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l.GraduatedTaxRates.-Thiscountry'suseofgraduatedtaxrateswas

apparent upon Congress's enactment of the historic Income Tax Act of 1913.63
Congress's purpose of enacting the Act included reducing tariff duties and
generating revenue. In the congressional debates preceding the enactment of the
1913 Act, Representative Murray of Oklahoma prophesied about the turbulent
future of the graduated income tax rates, stating that "in this bill we have a
clause we call the income tax, based upon a graduated scale as to the different
rates; and I may say that this proper graduation will depend largely upon
experiment. " 64 This so-called experiment has resulted in numerous and frequent
congressional revisions in an effort to develop the proper level of graduation.
Congress has made a multitude of changes to the graduated rates since the
enactment of the 1913 Act. The 1913 Act imposed a normal tax of I% and
additional taxes ranging from 1% to 6% on net income starting at $20,000. 65 The
maximum rate was imposed on net income exceeding $500,000. 66 Under the Act
of 1916, entitled "An Act to increase the revenue and for other purposes",
Congress imposed a 2% tax on net income up to $2,000 and an additional tax
ranging from 1% for income exceeding $20,000 and 13% for income exceeding
$2,000,000. 67 Under the War Income Tax Act of 1917,68 Congress increased the
progressivity of the rate structure to defray war expenses and for other purposes.
In addition to the 2% tax rate assessed on net income up to $2,000, Congress
imposed a 4% tax on net income exceeding $2,000. 69 Congress further increased
the progressivity of the additional tax by enacting ten marginal tax brackets
ranging from 1% to 63%. 70 Under the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress imposed
a normal tax of 6% on net income up to $4,000 and a 12% tax on the balance.71
In 1918, there was also an additional tax imposed ranging from 1% to 65% and
54 different rates. 72 Congress continued its pattern of adjusting the progressivity
of the rates when it enacted the Revenue Act of 1921. The normal tax of 4% and
8% were imposed on income of $4,000 and amounts exceeding $4,000,

63. Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat 166.
64. See Willan, supra note 16, at 4.
65. See id. at 5; 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 140 (2000).
66. See Willan, supra note 16, at5.
67. 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) a  140 (2000).
68. Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300.
69. 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)' 140 (2000).
70. See id. The increase was rather drastic. In 1916, taxpayers with net income above
$2,000,000 were subject to an additional tax of 13%, but in 1917, taxpayers with income above
$1,000,000 were subject to the maximum rate of 50%. Id. In 1916, taxpayers with net income
between $1,000,000 and $1,500,000 were subject to a marginal rate of 11% and those with net
income between $1,500,000 and $2,000,000 were subject to a marginal rate of 12%. ld.
71. See id.
72. Seeid.
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respectively. 73 For tax year 1921, the marginal rates did not change from the
earlier years, but more substantial changes were made under that act for tax year
1922.74 Under the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress eased the progressivity of the
surtax by enacting 48 marginal brackets ranging from 1% to 50%.75 The 1924
Revenue Act lowered the progressivity in both the normal tax and the surtax.
Congress implemented three brackets for the surtax ranging from 2% to 6% and
imposed a surtax ranging from 1% to 40% utilizing 40 different marginal rates. 76
The 1926 Act altered the normal tax brackets again by creating three marginal
rates from 1-% to 5%, but also reduced the maximum rate on the surtax to
20%. 77
Minor changes to the normal tax were made between 1926 and 1931 but
no changes were made to the surtax. However, more significant adjustments to
the progressive tax structure were made under the 1932 Act corresponding to the
financial strain caused by the Great Depression. 78 Congress reinstated the same
4% and 8% normal taxes that had been in existence from 1919 through 1923.79
It also greatly enhanced progressivity in the surtax enacting 53 marginal rates
ranging from 1% to 55%. 80 Under the 1934 and 1935 Acts, the normal tax was
4%, and there were 29 marginal tax brackets under the surtax ranging from 4%
on net income between $4,000 to $6 000 to 59% on net income of $5,000,000
and up. 81 From 1936 to 1939, the number of marginal brackets under the surtax
increased to 32 and the maximum rate increased to a startling 75%. 82 Congress
made minor adjustments to the rates during 1940; however beginning in 1941
and continuing for several years, Congress greatly increased the progressivity for
all income categories. 1bese increases corresponded with theiinancial constraints
caused by World War II. 83 Although Congress had declined to impose a surtax
on income lower than $4,000 to $5,000 under previous Acts, Congress altered
that trend in 1941. Under the 1941 Act, Congress impo ed a surtax ranging from
6% to 77% on net income. 84 The normal tax increased to 6% under the 1942 Act,
and Congress imposed a surtax ranging from 13% on net income between $0 and

73. Seeid.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Seeid.
77. Seeid.
78. See Barber B. Conable, Jr., Congress and the Income Tax 38 (1989).
79. 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 140 (2000).
80. See id.
81. See id. 141.
82. Seeid.
83. See Conable, supra note 78, at 38.
84. 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)' 141.
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$2,000 and 82% on net income of at least $200,000. 85 The dramatic increase in
the marginal surtax brackets reached its pinnacle in 1944 when Congress
imposed a surtax ranging from 20% on net income between $0 and $2,000 and
91% on net income exceeding $200,000. 86
In 1945, Congress once again adjusted the marginal rates and imposed
a 17% surtax on net income between $0 and $2,000 and 88% on net income
exceeding $200,000. 87 Surprisingly, the rates remained constant through 1950.
From 1951 through 1963, Congress only made minor modifications to the
marginal surtax brackets and the brackets remained relatively constant. 88 Taxable
year 1964 was the last year that Congress imposed the normal tax and surtax. 89
It also represented a year in which Congress reduced the marginal surtax rates
and imposed a new rate structure ranging from 13% for net income between $0
and $500 and 74% for net income above $200,000. 90
From 1965 through 1981, the lowest marginal rate was 14% and the
highest marginal rate was 70%. 91 While the bottom and top rates remained
constant, there were fluctuations of the intermediary rates as well as inflationary
modifications. 92 In addition, from 1979 through 1986, no tax was imposed for
incomeless than $2,200for 1977 and 1978 and$2,300for 1979 through 1981.93
From 1982 through 1986, Congress exempted taxable income less than a
nominal amount. More importantly, Congress reduced the highest marginal rate
from 70% to 50% but made more modest reductions in the other marginal tax
brackets during those same taxable years. 94
In the past 15 years, Congress has continued its inconsistency in
promoting progressive taxation. Under the rate structure immediately prior to
1986, the tax rates ranged from 11% to 50%, and there were 15 marginal income
rates. 95 In its attempt to simplify the Code, Congress significantly reduced the
total number of marginal rates upon the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986. 96 The reduced rate structure was implemented in two phases. During
85. Seeid.
86. See id. Under the Act, Congress also reduced the normal tax from 6% to 3%. Id.
The 3% surtax remained at 3% through 1964. Id. 142.
87. See id.' 142.
88. See id.  a  142 & 143. After that time, the surtax was phased out completely.
89. Compare id., 142 with id., 144.
90. See id. 143. During 1952 and 1953, however, Congress imposed surtaxes
ranging from 19.2% to 89%, but Congress reduced the rates in 1954 to their pre-1952
percentages. Id. , 142.
91. See id. 144.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.

16

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 5:1

taxable year 1987, there were five rates ranging from 11% to 38.5 %. 97 Beginning
in 1988, the greatly compressed marginal rates were 15% and 28%. 98 Congress
also imposed a surtax of 5% on taxable income between $43,150 and $89,560
for single taxpayers and $71,900 and $149,250 for married couples filing joint
retums. 99 Hence, the 1986 Act essentially created three tax brackets, 15%, 28%
and 33%, with the latter phased out for income levels above the designated
amoWlts. 100 The rate structure created under the 1986 Act lasted until Congress's
enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. 101 Under that Act,
Congress repealed the 5% surtax and introduced the 31% bracket for unmarried
individuals with income of over $49,300. 102 The rate structure enacted in 1990
continued to define the graduated rate structure until Congress enacted the
Omnibus Budge Reconciliation Act of 1993. 103 In the 1993 Act, Congress
amended the income tax rates for taxable year 1994 and established five marginal
income tax rates of 15%, 28%, 31%, 36% and 39.6%. 104 Surprisingly, given the
tumultuous history of the rate structure, Congress has not altered the rate
structure since it enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and
the rate structure enacted under that Act continues to represent the graduated rate
structure in existence today. 105 Although Congress has not adjusted the graduated
tax rates for ordinary income, it has altered the level of progressivity in other
ways, including capital gains rates.
2. The Earned Income Tax Credit.-A refundable tax credit is afforded
to taxpayers that satisfy certain income limitations. 106 The credit is afforded to
taxpayers whose income exceeds the threshold floor levels but falls below a
threshold ceiling. Congress enacted the earned income tax credit in 1975 to
counter the regressive nature of the social security taxes and as an antiinflationary measure. 107 In recent years, the earned income tax credit has become
more important in light of the repeal of the Aid to Families with Dependent

97. 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 144 (2000).
98. Seeid.
99. See Willan, supra note 16, at 64.
100. 1 Standard Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 144 (2000).
101. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
102. See Willan, supra note 16, at 69.
103. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
104. See id.
105 . IRC § 1(a).
106. See IRC § 32.
107. S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 22 ( 1975 ). According to Professor Jonathan Barry Forman,
it would be simpler if low -income taxpayers were not subject to the social security tax by either
adding standard deductions and personal exemptions to the social security tax or exempting the
first $5,000 or $10,000 of income from the tax. Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for
Low-Income Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 145, 184-85 (1996).
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Children program in 1996. Proponents hail the program as both pro-family and
pro-work, two problems that existed under the now defunct welfare system. 108
The maximum earned income credit amount has increased drastically since
Congress's enactment of the credit in 1975. At that time, the maximum credit
amount was $400. 109 For taxable year 1999, the maximum credit allowed was
$3,816. 110 In 1975, the total refundable portion provided to taxpayers was
$886.7 million, and in 1997 the projected figure was $24.6 billion. 111 Based on
these statistics, the earned income tax credit is increasingly satisfying the
congressional objectives of progressivity.
3. The Use of Phase-outs.-The use of phase-outs can be an effective
method to achieve a progressive tax structure. The Code utilizes two types of
phase-outs to achieve progressivity. First, the Code employs ceilings to preclude
upper income taxpayers from availing themselves of certain deductions and
credits or to reduce the amount of the deductions and credits afforded to upper
income taxpayers. Second, a taxpayer is required to reduce itemized deductions
if their adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount adjusted annually for
inflation 112
a. The Increased Use of Ceilings.--Several recent statutory
enactments employ phase-outs that prevent the wealthy taxpayers from availing
themselves of the benefits. Congress utilized ceilings when it enacted several
recent statutory provisions in the Code to promote or encourage education
Empirical data establishes that college graduates earn higher incomes than

108. Anne L. Alsott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 534 (1995). Professor Alsott notes the risk of
associating the earned income tax credit with welfare because critics may view it as a handout
similar to welfare payments. ld. at 537.
109. See id. at 537.
110. Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-521.R.B. 18, at 5.
111. See Internal Revenue Service, 19 Stat. of Income Bull., Selected Historical &
Other Data, at 195 (Summer 1999). The approximate earned income credit for the stated years
was as follows:
Year
Amount Refunded
Amount used to offset taxes
1975
$886.7 million
$111.0 million
$164.5 million
$ 1.4 billion
1980
1985
$209.2 million
$ 1.5 billion
$ 5.3 billion
$659.3 million
1990
$ 20.8 billion
1995
$ 2.0 billion
1996
$ 23.2 billion
$ 2.1 billion
$ 24.6 billion
1997
$ 2.2 billion

I d.

112. See IRC § 68.
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individuals who have not attended college. Hence, one of the most efficient
mechanisms that should be used to combat poverty is by government support of
educational programs. United States Census Bureau statistics establish that there
is a substantial difference between the income that a college graduate earns and
the income earned by high school graduates. According to the Census Bureau,
median income characteristics for 1998 were as follows:

l

Median Income of Full-Time, Year-Round Workers
Characteristic

Female

Male

High School Grad

$21 ,963

$30,868

Bachelor's Degree

$35,408

49,982113

Because of the correlation between one's level of education and income level,
Congress has promoted education to better enable low income and middle income
students to attend college. First, a taxpayer is able to contribute $500 to an
education individual retirement account each year for beneficiaries younger than
age 18.4 Upon distribution, any gain will be excluded from income provided
that they do not exceed the qualified higher education expenses. 115 The
contribution limit is phased out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross income
more than $95,000 but less than $110,000 Second, Congress enacted the
Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit. 117 The Hope
Scholarship Credit provides a nonrefundable credit up to $1,500 per student for
the first two years of postsecondary education. 118 The Lifetime Learning Credit
provides a nonrefundable credit up to $1,000 per taxpayer for qualified tuition
and related expenses. 119 During a tax year, a taxpayer may elect only one of the
foregoing tax benefits per student. 120 The credits are phased out if the taxpayer's

113. U.S. Census Bureau, Money Income in the United States: 1998; Current
Population Reports, at xi (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Money] .
114. IRC § 530(b){l)(A)(ii) & (iii).
115. See id. § 530(a). "Qualifed higher education expenses' generally mean tuition,
fees , books, supp lies and other required equipment to the extent the beneficiary did not claim
the Hope Scholarship Credit or the Life time Learning Credit Id. §§ 529(e)(3)(A) &
530(b )(2)(A).
116. I d. § 530(c)(1 ). For taxpayers filing joint returns, the contribution is phased out
where adjusted gross income exceeds $150,000 and less than $160,000. ld.
117. See id. § 25A(a).
118. See id. § 25A(b)(1).
119. See id. § 25A(c)(1).
120. See id. § 25A(c)(2) & (e)(2).
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modified adjusted gross income is between $40,000 and $50,000. 121 Congress
also enacted a provision that allowed taxpayers to deduct interest on educati nal
loans. 122 Under this provision, taxpayers are able to deduct up to $2,000 for
interest paid on any qualified education loan during thefLUst 60 days that interest
payments are required. 123 The deduction is phased out if the taxpayer's modified
adjusted gross income is between $40,000 and $55,000. 124
In addition, Congress has also enacted tax incentives to increase the
savings rate oflowerto middle income taxpayers. 125 Congress enactedRoth,RAs
during 1997 to encourage savings. Like other IR.As, the maximum amount
taxpayers can contribute to a Roth IRA is $2,000 per year. 126 There are several
differences between traditionaliR.As and Roth IRAs. Higher income taxpayers
are able to contribute to Roth IRAs but are precluded from making deductible
contributions to traditional IR.As. The yearly contribution amount to Roth IRAs
is phased out for individual taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes between
$95 000 and $110,000, 127 while the maximum contribution amount for ordinary
deductible IRAs is phased out where adjusted gross income is between $32,000
and $42,000. 128 A second significant difference between Roth lRAs and
traditional IRAs is that no deduction is allowed for amounts contributed to Roth
IRAs while deductions are provided for the traditional IRAs. 129 Finally, if a
payment from a Roth IRA is made on or after the day the contributor turns 59 1/2

121. ld. § 25A(d). For taxpayers filing a joint return the credits are phased out
where modified adjusted gross income is between $80,000 and $100,000. ld.
122. See id. § 221.
123. ld. § 22l(b)(1) & (d).
124. Id. § 221 (b )(2 ). For taxpayers filing a joint return, the deduction is phased out
where modified adjusted gross income is between $60,000 and $75,000. ld.
125. The current income tax structure encourages savings and investments similar
to a consumption tax. Under a cash flow method, like the Unlimited Savings Account Tax,
taxpayers would deduct the amount put into savings or investment vehicles from their gross
income, thus avoiding taxation on that income until consumed. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., The
Deceptively DisparateTreatmentofBusiness andlnvestmentlnterestExpense Under a CashFlow Consumption Tax and a Schanz-Haig-Simons Income Tax, 3 Fla. Tax Rev. 544 (1997);
see Lester B. Snyder & Roger J. Higgins. Evaluating the Consumption Tax Proposals: Changes
in the Taxation oflnterspousal Transactions, Use of Trusts, and Revising the Meaning of "Tax
Planning," 33 San Diego L. Rev.l485,1487 (1996) {discussing tax proposals that would either
exclude investment income from gross income or allow full deduction for investment income).
126. Regs.§ 1.408A-3, q&a 3(b).
127. IRC § 408A(c)(3)(A) & (C). For married couples ftling joint returns, the
contribution amount is phased out for adjusted gross income between $150,000 and $160,000.
Id.
128. ld. § 219(g)(2)(A) & (B). For married taxpayers ftling a joint return, the
maximum contribution amount phases out between $52,000 and $62,000. ld.
129. See id. § 408A(c)(1).
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or is made to a beneficiary after the contributor's death or the individual becomes
disabled, the payment is not included in the contributor's gross income. 130

b. Phase-out of Itemized Deductions and Personal
Exemptions.-Vnder the Code, taxpayers whose adjusted gross income exceeds

the applicable amount must reduce their itemized deductions by a percentage. 131
During taxable year 1998, 4.8 million taxpayers were subject to the phase-out
resulting in $25.9 billion disallowed itemized deductions. 132 For taxable year
2000, the applicable amount was $128,950 for married couples filing joint
returns and $64,475 for married filing separately. 133 In addition, the Code
requires taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes above a threshold amount to
reduce the personal exemption amount, and the exemption is completely phased
out for some wealthy taxpayers. 134

4./ncomeTaxExemptionforLowlncomes.-Ataxpayerisnotrequired
to file a tax return to the extent that gross income does not exceed the allowance
for a personal exemption135 and standard deduction. 136 Both of these allowances
are adjusted annually for inflation. 137 For taxable year 2000, the personal
exemption allowance is $2,800 for each taxpayer and spouse and an additional
$2,800 for each dependent 138 The standard deduction for married taxpayers
filing a joint return is $7,350 and for single taxpayers it is $4,400.139 Based on
the standard deduction and allowance for personal exemptions, single taxpayers

130. See id. § 408A(d)(1) & (2).
131. See id. § 68(a). The applicable amount is adjusted annually for inflation. See id.
§ 68(b)(1) & (2).
132. Tom Herman, Backdoor Tax Increases Hit Growing Numbers of People, Wall
St. J., July 5, 2000, atAl.
133. Rev. Proc. 99-42, 1999-46,.R.B. 568, at 7.
134. See id. at 8. For taxable year 2000, the personal exemption begins to phase out
and is completely phased out based on the following adjusted gross income levels:
Filing Status
Threshold Phase-out
Completed Phase-out
A
m
o
u
n
t
Amount
Married filing joint return
$193,400
$315,900
161,150
283,650
Heads of household
128,950
251,450
Single
96,700
157,950
Married filing separately

Id.

135. See IRC § 151.
136. See id. § 63.
137. Seeid. § 63(c)(4) andiRC § 151(d)(4).
138. Rev.Proc. 99-42, 1999-46,R.B. 568,at8; seeiRC § 151(b)(allowingpersonal
exemption for taxpayer and spouse); id. § 151 (c) (allowing additional personal exemptions for
dependents).
139. See Rev. Proc. 99-42, 1999-46 I.R.B. 568, at 6.
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are exempted from filing a tax return where the gross income does not exceed
$7,200 and married couples are not required to file a tax return where gross
income does not exceed $12,950.
5. Corporate Taxation.-The government collects billions of corporate
tax dollars annually. Under the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, corporations were
subject to a flat tax of 1% on corporate income. 140 Today, the corporate tax
consists of four marginal brackets ranging from 15% to 35%. 141 Generally,
wealthy taxpayers, rather than lower income taxpayers, own stock in
corporations; therefore, any corporate taxes collected by the government will
result in increased progressivity. Investtnents held in the corporate form are
subject to the so-called double tax because income is taxed at the corporate
level142 and then at the individual shareholder level upon distribution of the
profits as dividends. 143 Dividend income represents the only stream of income
that is subject to two levels of taxation. 144 As with other types of taxes, the
corporate tax is controversial. 145 While opponents of the double tax argue that
the Congress should repeal the corporate tax, 146 supporters believe it is an
equitable manner of promoting progressivity. 147
6. Estate and Gift Taxation.-The estate tax was first enacted during
1898 to help finance the war and 'for other purposes. " 148 The progressive tax
system is fiUPly established in the estate and gift tax scheme. Taxpayers are
entitled to make sizeable gifts without being subject to the estate and gift taxes.

140. See Willan, supra note 16, at 5.
141. IRC § 1l(b)(1). Traditionally, the corporate tax rates were higher than the
individual rates. However, 1993legislation reversed this trend.
142. IRC § ll(a).
143. ld. § 61(a)(7).
144. For a discussion on how the corporate tax is inconsistent with "horizontal
equity," see Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate
Income, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613 (1990).
145. See PatriFN E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44
Cath. U. L. Rev. 437, 445-46 (1995) (stating that opponents of corporaWe double taxation do
not believe there is substantial difference between corporations and partnerships while
proponents believe that the independent legal entitles result in special privileges requiring
different treatment).
146. In one study, Professor Alvin C. Warren, Jr. considered several alternatives to
the current system to resolve the double corporate tax. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., American Law
Inst, Federal Income Tax Project: Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes
(1993).
147. See Kwall, supra note 144, at 633-35 ("[I]fthe corporate tax acts as an indirect
tax on shareholders, it can be defended on equitable grounds as having a progressive effect.")
148. War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448,40 Stat. 448.
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For the following taxable years the exclusions per taxpayer are as follows:
Tax Year

Applicable Exclusion

2000 and 2001
2002 and 2003
2004
2005
2006 and thereafter

$ 675,000
700,000
850,000
950,000
1,000,000149

The progressive nature of the estate and gift tax is also apparent in the rate
structure. Upon enactment, the tax imposed increased on the basis of the value
of the property. 150 An additional tax was imposed on estates exceeding
$25,000. 151 The maximum additional tax was 3% on estates exceeding
$1,000,000. 152 Today, the tax rates range from 18% to 55% for estates exceeding
the applicable exclusion. 153 The 55% rate applies to transfers over $3,000,000
and was reinstated under the Onmibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. 154 The
legislative history contains the following reasons for its enactment: "to raise
revenue, to address the Federal deficit, to improve tax equity, and to make the
tax system more progressive, the committee believes that the top two estate and
gift tax rates which expired at the end of 1992 should be reinstated."155 An
additional5% tax is imposed on certain high taxable estates. 156 During 1995,
only 3.4% of estates were subject to the estate tax157 and presently only 2% of
estates are subject to the estate tax. 158 The reported estate tax liability was $11.8
149. See IRC § 2011.
150. See id.
151. Seeid.
152. Seeid.
153. Seeid. § 2001(c)(1).
154. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13208, 107 Stat. 312, 469 (1993).
155.H.R.Rep.No.103-111,at644(1993),reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,875.
The Act increased rates retroactively. As a result, the taxpayers in Quarty v. United States,
asserted that the retroactivity was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and the Takings Clauses. Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961,964 (4th
Cir. 1999). The court rejected the taxpayer's due process argument and concluded that the
retroactive aspect of the legislation was rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.
ld. at 967. It also rejected the taxpayer's argument that a taking had occurred because it was
not arbitrary. I d. at 969-70.
156. See IRC § 2001(c)(2).
157. Barry W. Johnson & Jacob M . Mikow, Federal Estate Tax Returns, 1995-1997,
Internal Revenue Service, 19 Stat. of Income Bull., at 69, 71 (Summer 1999) [hereinafter
Johnson &Mikow].
158. Jackie Calmes and Jim VandeHei, House Votes to Repeal the 'Death Tax':
Clinton Veto Is Expected On Measure Affecting 2% of All Estates, Wall St. J., June 12,2000,
atA2.
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billion, $14.5 billion and $16.6 billion for tax years 1995, 1996 and 1997,
respectively. 159 The estate tax accounted for approximately 1% of all tax
revenues collected during those years. 160 Hence, the estate tax accounted for a
very small portion of the total tax revenue collected during those years.
Ill. WEAKNESSES INHERENT IN THE CURRENT PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
METHODOLOGY AND THE GROWING THREAT

A In General

•

The after-tax income of taxpayers in the top 10% of income earners,
particularly the top 1%, has increased between 1977 and 1990. 161 In Professors
McMahon's and Abreu's comprehensive law review article, they critically
analyzed empirical data on changes in the distribution of income compared with
the total taxes paid between 1977 and 1990. 162 They noted that during 1990
families in the top one percentile had the same share of income as those in the
bottom 40th percentile. 163 According to Professors McMahon and Abreu, the
increase in the income of the top 1% has exceeded the increase in their tax
liability. 164 Other tax experts have found similar patterns extending to tax year
1993. Between 1980 and 1993, while the total effective rate for all families
hovered around 23%, it declined by approximately 10% for families in the top
1% income bracket. 165 The increase in the disparity between the income levels of
the top 1% taxpayers and lower income taxpayers has not resulted in a
proportional increase in the tax burden to the wealthy. 166
Between 1991 and 1997, the tax as a percentage of adjusted gross
income has fluctuated in part as a result of changes in the marginal rates.
However, since 1995 the rates have remained unchanged, but the tax as a
percentage of adjusted gross income continues to fluctuate. In particular, as the
159. See Johnson & Mikow, supra note 157, at 82.
160. See id.
161. See McMahon & Abreu, supra note 8, at 1. Professors McMahon and Abreu
derived this data from the Distribution of Income and Tax Burdens by Household, Appendix
Kin the Committee on Ways and Means, Overview of Entitlement Programs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Comm. Print 1993). Id. at5, n.7.
162. See id.
163. See id. at5.
164. See id. at 8.
165. See Richard Kastey, et al., Trends in Federal Tax Progressivity, 1980-93, in Tax
Progressivity and Income Inequality 10 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1994).
166. See McMahon & Abreu, supra note 8, at 8-9. One of the basic premises under
the McMahon and Abreu article was that when you isolate the top 1% from other wealthy
individuals, you uncover the disproportionate reduction in tax rates afforded to taxp aye[s in the
top 1%.

...
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income of the taxpayers comprising the highest tax brackets increased, their tax
as a percentage of adjusted gross income decreased each year. 'This phenomenon
was evident where the adjusted gross income of the taxpayers was $1,000,000
ormore. 167
The tax as a percentage of adjusted gross income for high income
taxpayers decreased by more than two percentage points between 1995 and
1997. 168 With the exception of adjusted gross incomes between $200,000 and
$1,000,000, every other income level saw negligible changes in the
percentages. 169 More significantly, there was even a slight increase in the tax as
a percentage of adjusted gross income between 1995 and 1997 for taxpayers at
the lower adjusted gross income levels. 170
The decreased progressivity is the result of a combination of factors.
Professor Sharon N antell provided a possible justification for the
disproportionate increase in the tax burden. Professor N antell noted the
following:
The most glaring consequence of a system of tax laws created by and for
wealthy, white males is the exacerbation of 'a growing gap in the
relative economic positions between rich and poor, the latter
disproportionately represented by women, children and people of color.'
Tax provisions such as the mortgage interest deduction and the
preferential tax treatment for capital gains primarily benefit taxpayers
in the upper-income brackets. 171
Consequently, in determining whether the Code js effective in promoting a
progressive tax system, consideration must be given to the tax benefits associated
with personal residences capital assets and other tax incentives.
The tax-favored treatment of capital gains accounts for a substantial
portion of the tax savings afforded to the wealthy, and has been the subject of
substantial debate and statutory modification. 172 Under the Code, the maximum
167. See Internal Revenue Service, 15 Stat. oflncome Bull., Selected Historical &
Other Data, at 141, 197 (Fall1995).
168. See id.
169. For taxpayers with adjusted gross income between $200,000 and $1,000,000,
the tax as a percentage of adjusted gross income decreased by an average of 1%. See id.
170. For taxpayers with adjusted gross income between $1 and $1,000 the tax as a
percentage increased from 2.9% to 7%, and taxpayers with adjusted gross income between
$1,000 and $7,000 had their tax as a percentage of adjusted gross income increase by 0.6%. See
id.
171. Sharon C. Nantell, A Cultural Perspective on American Tax Policy, 2 Chap. L.
Rev. 33, 67 (1999) (citing Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of
"Taxing Men," 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 485,528 (1997)).
172. For example, Professor Martin J. McMahon, Jr. disfavors the preferential capital
gain rates because of the discriminatory effect, negative impact on the progressive rate
structure and increased complexity. Martin J. McMahon, Individual Tax Reform for Fairness
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tax rate for net capital gains is 20%. 173 Where a taxpayer purchases an asset
after December 31, 2000, and holds on to the capital asset for at least five years,
the maximum tax rate is reduced to 18%. 174 During taxable year 1997, net
capital gain represented a substantial portion of adjusted gross income and was
second only to salaries and wages. 175 According to statistics published by the
Internal Revenue Service, net capital gain totaled $347.9 billion, an increase of
38.1% from the previous tax year. 176 Of the total $347.9 billion figure, $232.5
billion was reported on tax returns with adjusted gross income of $200,000 or
more and $44.9 billion was reported on tax returns with adjusted gross income
between $100,000 and $200,000. 177 Consequently, taxpayers earning $100,000
or more reported approximately 80% of all net capital gain during taxable year
1997. 178 The obvious effect of this empirical data is that the primary beneficiaries
of the favored rates are wealthy taxpayers, and a substantial portion of taxable
income earned by upper income taxpayers was taxed at rates below or only
slightly above income earned by lower income taxpayers. Specifically, Table I
based on IRS Statistics, depicts the form of assets held by the wealthiest males
and females. 179

and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 459,470-73
(1993); see also 143 Cong. Rec. H6623-04, H6628 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) ("[t]he lowering
of the capital gains rate benefits the wealthy in this country, and it is clear that will happen
when we get the rate down to 18% which is almost the lowest tax rate on regular income, that
this will have thrown gasoline on the whole class warfare issue").
173. See IRC § 1(h).
174. See id. §1(h)(2)(B). Where a taxpayer is taxed at the 15% rate on ordinary
income, the maximum rate for assets held for 5 years is 8% irrespective of the holding period.
ld. § 1(h)(2)(A).
175. See Internal Revenue Service, 18 Stat. of Income Bull., Bulletin Board, at 2-3
(Spring 1999).
176. Seeid.
177. See Internal Revenue Service, 18 Stat. of Income Bull., Revision to Winter
1998-1999 Issue, at 6, 143 (Spring 1999).
178. Interestingly, taxpayers reporting adjusted gross income of $100,000 or more,
reported only 21% of the net capital losses. ld. Because no more than $3,000 of capital losses
can be deducted against ordinary income, they are generally considered less favorable than
ordinary losses. See IRC § 1211(b ).
179. See Internal Revenue Service, 17 Stat. oflncome Bull.,at 71-73 (Winter 199798).
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Table I

FEMALES

MALES

$600,000- $1,000,000

Financial Assets
Other Real Estate
Personal Residence
Retirement Accounts
Cash

21 Percent
20 Percent
17 Percent
13 Percent
10 Percent

$1,000,000 or $10,000,000

Financial Assets
Other Real Estate
Closely-held Stock
Cash
Personal Residence
Retirement Accounts

26Percent
18 Percent
12.5 Percent
11 Percent
7.5 Percent
5 Percent

$10,000,000 or more

Financial Assets
Closely-held Stock
Other Real Estate
Cash
Personal Residence
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33 Percent
28Percent
9.5 Percent
5 Percent
2Percent

$600,000- $1,000,000

Financial Assets
27 Percent
Other Real Estate
20 Percent
Personal Residence 17.5 Percent
Cash
14.5 Percent
Retirement Accounts 7.5 Percent

$1,000,000 or $10,000,000

Financial Assets
Other Real Estate
Cash
Personal Residence
Closely-held Stock
Retirement Accounts

39 Percent
18 Percent
12Percent
10 Percent
7 Percent
6Percent

$10,000,000 or more

Financial Assets
Closely-held Stock
Other Real Estate
Cash
Personal Residence

53.4 Percent
11.6 Percent
9 Percent
6Percent
2 Percent

The IRS statistics show that a substantial portion of the top
wealtbho1ders' net wealth was attributable to investments in financial assets such
as stocks and mutual funds. The statistics also show that there is a sizeable
increase in the percentage of assets held in the fonn of financial assets as the
wealth increases. With respect to males, the percentage of assets held in the fonn
of financial assets increased from 21% to 33% as the wealth grew. Similarly,
with respect to females, the percentage of assets held in the form of financial
assets increased with the level of wealth from 27% to 53%. Given the status of
stocks, mutual funds and other financial assets as capital assets, the disposition
of these assets has the obvious benefit of taxing the gain at very favorable rates.
Another category of assets where the percentage of assets increases as
wealth increases is closely held stock. Consistent with the treatment of financial
assets, the disposition of closely held stock may receive favorable tax treatment.
Under the Code, taxpayers that satisfy the statutory requirements are able to
exclude 50% of the gain from the disposition of "qualified small business stock"
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held for more than five years. 180 The maximum amount of the exclusion is the
greater of $10,000,000 or ten times the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the stock. 181
The empirical data establishes that for both males and females as the net worth
increases so does the possibility that the sale or other disposition will result in
tax-favored treatment in the form of an exclusion or lowered capital gain rates.
Assuming that the taxpayers could satisfy all statutory requirements, the
percentage of assets disposed of that would be afforded favorable treatment was:
Net Worth
$ 600,000-$ 1,000,000
$ 1,000,000- $10,000,000
$10,000,000 or more

Males
38%182
46%
63%

Females
44.5%
57%
67%

B. Homeownership Tax Incentives
Another tax incentive that limits the effectiveness of the progressive
structure pertains to homeownership. The mortgage interest deduction results in
the Code discriminating in favor ofhomeowners. 183 The Code allows for gain not
exceeding $250,000 ($500,000 for married coupled filing a joint return) to be
excluded from gross income where the taxpayer resided in the home for at least
two years during a five year period. 184 The Code also allows a deduction for
interest paid on indebtedness incurred on the acquisition or improvement of a
personal residence185 and interest paid on home equity up to $100,000 of
indebtedness. 186 For taxable year 1993, the home mortgage deduction resulted in
total tax savings of $45.1 billion. 187 Although some scholars advocate the total

180. IRC § 1202(a)(1 ). In order to qualify as a qualified small business, the aggregate
gross assets must not exceed $50,000,000. Id. § 1202(d).
181. See id. §§ 1(h)(4), (5) & 1202(b).
182. The percentages are based on the application of the exclusion on gain from the
sale of a personal residence provided under IRC § 121, the tax-favored capital gain rates of IRC
§ 1, and the exclusion for gain from the disposition of qualified small business stock under IRC
§ 1202.
183. There is a disparity between Whites and other ethnic groups in home ownership.
Only 46.3% of African Americans and 45.5% of Hispanics own their homes while 73.2% of
Whites own theirs. Homeownership Annual Statistics: 1999, Table 20, U.S. Census Bureau,
athttp://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual99/ann99t20.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2001).
184. IRC § 121(a) & (b)(1). Where a husband and wife file a joint return, the amount
of the exclusion is $500,000. Id. § 121(b)(2).
185. Id. § 163(h)(3)(A)(i) & (B).
186. Id. § 163(h)(3)(A)(ii) & (C).
187. Senator Pete V. Domenici, The Unamerican Spirit of the Federal Income Tax,
31 Harv. J. on Legis. 273,293 (1994).
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repeal of the home mortgage deduction, 188 the deduction attributable to home
equity indebtedness creates the greater problem. The proceeds from home equity
indebtedness may be used for any purpose. Homeowners are able to deduct
mortgage interest payments indirectly made for the purchase of automobiles,
boats, tuition and vacations even though the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed
a deduction for personal interest. 189
C. Corporate Taxation
There is evidence suggesting that the corporate tax is ineffective in
taxing corporate income because ofnwnerous corporate tax breaks. 190 According
to the Congressional Budget Office, in 1952 corporate income taxes accounted
for 32% oftotal federal revenues but only 9% in 1995. 191 The actual amount of
total income tax after deductions and credits consistently increased from 1991
through 1996. However, the deductions and credits considerably exceeded the
total. income tax after deductions and credits, and the percentage increase in
deductions and credits was disproportionately greater than the increase in the
total income tax during most of those taxable years. The disparity was greatest
in 1995 and 1996. The results are provided in Table II.

)

188. See McMahon, supra note 23, at 487.
189. Several legal scholars have criticized the mortgage interest deduction as being
discriminatory. According to Professor Joseph A. Snoe, Congress enacted the mortgage interest
deduction provisions to lighten the burden associated with borrowing for education, health care
and unforeseen emergencies. See Joseph A. Snoe, My Home, My Debt: Remodeling the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 80 Ky. L.J. 431, 437-40, 491 (1992). According to Professor
Snoe, these policy concerns justify a deduction for all taxpayers that borrow funds to satisfy
these expenses. ld. at 491 ; see also William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions
of the Mortgage Interest Deduction," 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 43 (1996) (stating that "because
of inequalities favoring the upper-income taxpayers, interest deduction should either be
curtailed or eliminated").
190. In 1984, a publication was issued establishing that 128 out of 250 of the largest
corporations did not pay any federal income taxes at least once between 1981 and 1983. See
Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy in Tax Progressivity
and Income Inequality 309,322 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994).
191. Christopher St. John, Tax Breaks and Corporate Responsibility, Me. L. Rev.
(Feb. 4, 1998), http://www .mecep.org/news2/980304.shtml (last modified Mar. 2, 2000).
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Table II
Year

Total Income Tax

1991

$ 92.6 billion

-

1992

$101.5 billion

9.69

1993

$119.9 billion

1994

%Change

Deduction

%Change

Credit

%Change

$122.6 billion

-

$28.5

.1992
1

$117.6 billion

-4.09

$29.7

4.29193

18.1

$136.5 billion

16.1

$34.5

16.0194

$135.5 billion

13.0

$142.3 billion

4.2

$37.3

8.0 195

1995

$156.4 billion

15.0

$205.2 billion

44.2

$42.4

13.8196

1996

$170.6 billion

9.1

$216.7 billion

5.6

$53.1

25.2197

Another problem with the corporate tax is that it is unclear who actually
bears the tax burden. The four possible contenders for bearing the burden are: 1)
owners or shareholders of the corporation; 2) owners of capital in general; 3)
consumers through inflated prices; or 4) workers through reduced wages. 198
Some businesses might shift such an expense to consumers by increasing costs,
but too much shifting would be inflationary. Based on this practice, one could
easily conclude that consumers actually bear the cost of the corporate tax
expense because it is similar to any other business expense. It is also conceivable
that corporate directors protect earnings and profits by reducing expenses,
including workforce downsizing, reduced wages and increased operations in third
world countries, which would place the onus of the corporate tax on the
employees. 199 In theory, the corporate tax is borne entirely by the shareholders.
192. See Jonathan E. Shook and Janice Washington, Corporation Income Tax
Returns, 1992, Internal Revenue Service, 15 Stat. oflncome Bull., at 14-15 (Summer 1995).
193. Seeid.
194. See Michael G. Seiders, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1993, Internal
Revenue Service, 16 Stat. of Income Bull., Summer 1996, at 36,43-44.
195. See Madeline Deming Boerner, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1994, Internal
Revenue Service, 17 Stat. of Income Bull., Summer 1997, at 50, 58-59.
196. See Matthew Scoffi.c & Patrice Treubert, Corporation Income Tax Returns,
1996, 19 Stat. oflncome Bull., Summer 1999, at 50, 57-58.
197. See id.
198. See Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy, 142, 144 (5th ed. 1987). One
professor at the University of California at Davis posed the question to his introductory
microeconomics class of 150 and received the following responses: 1) 6% believed workers
bear the corporate tax; 2) 9% believed that shareholders bear the tax burden; 3) 30% believed
that all investors in the economy bear the tax; and4) 55% believed that consumers bear the tax .
See Sheffrin, supra note 190, at 323.
199. If the corporate tax is borne by employees in the form of lower compensation,
the CEOs and other high-ranking corporate executives seem to escape this financial burden.
During 1999, the median salary including bonuses for top executives of 350 consulting firms
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In practice, the corporate tax is actually borne by all four contenders with the
more difficult question being the proper allotment. To the extent that the
corporate tax is borne by consumers, it is a regressive tax because lower-income
taxpayers spend a larger portion of their incomes on consumable products.

D. The Earned Income Tax Credit
Superficially, the increase in the refundable portion of the earned income
credit since its enactment establishes its success in meeting Congress's objective
of countering the regressive nature of the social security tax and serving as an
anti-inflationary measure. At first glance, the earned income tax credit is an
effective means of alleviating poverty. The earned income tax credit lifts some
low-income taxpayers above the poverty level but does not lift all taxpayers
above the poverty level. For example, during taxable year 1988, two-thirds of all
poor taxpayers did not receive earned income credit benefits. 200 For 1999 the
maximum earned income tax credit that could be received by a single taxpayer
with two or more children or a married couple filing a joint return with two or
more children was $3,816. 201 In order to receive the maximum credit, the
taxpayer's earned income could not exceed $12,460. 202 Hence, when you
combine the earned income with the earned income credit, the effective income
for the year is $16,27 6. For 1999, the poverty threshold for a family offour with
two children in the household was $16,895. 203 The family remains below the
poverty threshold by $619. The analysis is incomplete because the taxpayer is
also liable for social security tax and a tax for Medicare. Wages are subject to

was about $1.7 million and $120,000 higher than during 1998. DavidS. Brader, Of-Danitors and
Billionaires, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 2000, at B7. The highest paid executive made $170 million
in salary, bonuses and stock options. ld. The article pointed out that the janitors cleaning the
offices where the executives worked requested $1 an hour raises for each of the next three
years and that the $1.7 million would have funded the combined requested salaries of 80
striking janitors during the third year. Id. There is also evidence that even corporations with
low earnings and weak stock performance are rewarding their CEOs generous compensation
packages. While Coca-Cola shares dropped by 13%, the exiting CEO received a total
compensation package of $70 million, and while Bank of America's shares dropped by 17%,
the CEO received a compensation package totaling $49 million. Gary Strauss, The Billionaires
Club New Economy Rockets CEO Pay into the Stratosphere, USA Today, Apr. 15, 2000, at 1B.
200. Saul D. Hoffman & Laurence S. Seidman, The Earned Income Tax Credit:
Antipoverty Effectiveness and Labor Market Effects 28 (1990).
201. See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-2 C.B. 811.
202. See id.
203 .
Poverty
1999,
U.S.
Census
Bureau
at
http://www .census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshold/thresh99.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2000).
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social security tax of 6.2% and Medicare tax of 1.45%.204 The entire tax liability
for payroll taxes would total $953. Consequently, after factoring in the payroll
taxes, the taxpayer's after-tax income remains $1,572 below the poverty
threshold 205 A different result would obtain where the household consisted of two
children and was headed by a single parent. The poverty threshold for a single
parent with two children was $13,423 during 1999.206 When you combine the
earned income with the earned income credit, the effective income for the year is
$16,27 6. As a result of the earned income tax credit, the low-income taxpayer's
effective income is $2,853 above the poverty threshold. The maximum earned
income tax credit that could be received by a single parent with one child was
$2,312 for 1999, and the maximum income to receive that amount was
$12,4607 The poverty threshold for this family was $11,483 in 1999.208 Hence,
the effective income for the taxpayer is $14,772 and $3,289 over the poverty
level.
The earned income credit, however, does not enable a taxpayer to move
above the poverty level where the taxpayer does not have any children. The
maximum earned income tax credit that could be received by a taxpayer with no
children was $347 for 1999, and the maximum income to receive that amount
was $5,670. 209 The poverty threshold for a single individual was $8,480 in

204. IRC § 3101(a), (b). The earned income tax credit was enacted to offset the
regressive nature of the social security and Medicare taxes. See S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 22
(1975). Many low-income taxpayers must pay state income taxes as well. Some states waive
the state income taxes for low-income taxpayers, but approximately one-half of the states
require payment of income taxes irrespective of poverty level. Tax Report, Wall St. J., Mar.
29,2000, at Al.
205. These results are based in part of the marriage penalty that affects some
households. The House of Representatives and Senate had passed the "Marriage Tax Penalty
Relief Act of 2000," which would have reduced the so-called marriage penalty for most
taxpayers and reduced the marriage penalty inherent in the earned income tax credit. See H.R.
6m, 106th Cong. (2000). President Clinton vetoed the bill because of its expected benefit
primarily to upper income taxpayers. See Jim VandeHei, Senate Passes Bill to Dump Marriage
Tax: With Clinton Vowing to Veto, Hastert Seeks a Deal to Show Off for Voters, Wall St. J.,
July 19, 2000, at 24. Republicans attempted to override the presidential veto but failed by 16
votes. Jim VandeHei,G.O.P. Reloads with Marriage Tax, Debt Payment, Wall St. J., Sept.l4,
2000, at A1; see also Vada Waters Lindsey, The Burden of Being Poor: Increased Tax
Liability? The Taxation of Self-Help Programs, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 225,259-60, n.161
(1999) (opining that if the marriage penalty is eliminated, the marriage bonus must be
eliminated as well).
206. U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the United States: 1998, Current Population
Reports, at 1 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Poverty].
207. See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-2 C.B. 811.
208. See Poverty, supra note 206, at 1.
209. See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-2 C.B. 811.
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1998. 210 The total income for a taxpayer earning the maximum income and
therefore receiving the maximum earned income credit would be $6,017. As a
result, the taxpayer's income would be $2,463lower than the poverty threshold
established for 1998.

E. Estate Taxation
The Internal Revenue Service projects that the estate tax liability will be
reduced by $1.8 billion and $8.6 billion between years 2001 and 2007 because
of the increase in the unified credit and other changes enacted under the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997.211 The effect of these changes is to reduce the progressivity
in our overall tax structure. Significantly, the House of Representatives in a 279136 vote passed the "Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000" to phase out the tax212
altogether over a ten year period of time. 213 The Senate in a 59-39 vote also
passed the measure. 214 As expected, former President Clinton vetoed the bill, but
it is likely that efforts to repeal the tax will continue. 215 President Bush's tax plan
includes the complete repeal of the Federal estate tax. 216 Therefore, if a new tax
bill includes the elimination of the Federal estate tax, it is unlikely President Bush
will veto the bill as did his predecessor. If the Federal estate tax is eliminated,
there will be additional strain on the integrity of our progressive tax system.

F. The Use of Ceilings and Phase-outs
There are several weaknesses inherent where ceilings are employed to
promote progressivity. First, it is unlikely that progressivity is achieved between
low-income taxpayers and those taxpayers who are unable to avail themselves
of tax incentives because their income levels run afoul of a ceiling. If you
consider Roth IRAs, high-income taxpayers can easily afford to set aside $2,000
per year and are able to exclude from income future accessions to wealth.
Conversely, low-income taxpayers can theoretically invest in Roth IRAs as well,
but they are essentially foreclosed from the investment option because all their
disposable income is consumed by basic necessities. While low-income taxpayers
are essentially foreclosed from contributing to the Roth IRAs, many high-income

210. See Poverty, supra note 206, at 1.
211. See Johnson &Mikow, supra note 157, at 87.
212. See Calmes & VandeHei, supra note 158, at A2.
213. See H.R. 8, 106th Cong. (2000).
214. See Jim VandeHei, Despite Veto Threat, Senate is Expected to Clear MarriagePenalty Relief Plan, Wall St. J., July 17, 2000, at A36.
215. See Tax Report, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at AI.
216. See Glenn Kessler & Mike Allen, Bush to Contend Both Taxes, Debt Can Be
Reduced, Wash. Post, Feb. 25,2001, at Al.
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taxpayers are eligible to make the contributions. For 1998, households in the
upper 95th percentile earned income of $132,199 and households in the upper 80th
percentile earned income of $75,000. 217 The median income for that same year
was $38,885. 218 The Roth IRAs are phased out for single individuals between
$95,000and$110,000andformarriedcouplesbetween$150,000and$160,000.
The significance of these statistics is that the phase-outs do preclude the
wealthiest taxpayers from availing themselves of tax-free accession to wealth, as
advocated by Professors McMahon and Abreu, 219 but a sizeable portion of
wealthy taxpayers can, in fact, take advantage of the Roth IRA tax benefits.
Hence, as noted by Professors McMahon and Abreu, there is some widening to
the level of progressivity between the very wealthy and the moderately wealthy
but not to the level of progressivity between the lower to middle income taxpayer
and the wealthiest taxpayers. 220
A similar conclusion is reached when you consider educational IRAs,
Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit. While the U.S. Census
Bureau empirical data complements the government's promotion of higher
education, there is an issue as to whether the education should be promoted as a
direct expenditure or tax incentive. The recent legislation and budget establish
that Congress supports education by combining the two approaches. However,
the trends in federal student financial assistance indicate that the U.S.
Department of Education is providing students with declining amounts of
awards. During fiscal year 1999, federal student aid awards totaled $53.2
billion. 221 During fiscal year 2000, federal student aid awards totaled $50.6
billion 222 Conversely, Congress has increased the use of tax incentives as a
means of supporting education by enacting legislation that allows for an
exclusion from income of gains from distributions from educational IRAs, a
nonrefundable credit for certain educational expenses, and a deduction for
interest paid on educational loans. 223 The problem with the legislation that
promotes education is that the taxpayers with the most to gain from obtaining a
college degree are not able to either establish an educational IRA or pay for
qualified tuition and related expenses. 224 It is highly unlikely that a low-income
217. See Money, supra note 113, at xv.
218. See id.
219. See McMahon & Abreu, supra note 8, at 77.
220. See id. at 76-77.
221. Interim Performance Objectives, Final Report Fiscal Year 1999, Student
Financial Assistance, at http://www.ed.gov/PDFDocs/finalquarterly.pdf (last visited July 20,
2000).
222. Seeid.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 113-30.
224. Another unexpected problem with the Hope Credit and the Lifetime Learning
Credit is that they are underutilized. During taxable year 1998, taxpayers claimed a total of
$3.5 billion in the educational credits rather than thepredicted$6.7 billion in savings. Thomas
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taxpayer would be able to benefit from these tax incentives. Deductions and
credits are useless without sufficient income to offset. It is not realistic to expect
a lower to middle class family with three children and household income of
$25,000 to also be able to set aside $500 per child for an educational IRA.
Hence, the only families who are able to benefit from these tax incentives are
middle to upper income families. In addressing the effectiveness of these tax
incentives, it is important to recognize these severe limitations. The most
effective way for the government to subsidize education is a combination of the
tax incentives and direct expenditures. The Department of Education must
continue to subsidize college for low-income to middle-income individuals by
providing grants primarily and low-interest loans secondarily.
The phase-out of itemized deductions is also an ineffective method of
ensuring progressivity. Although a substantial amount of itemized deductions
were excluded, the phase-out is ineffective in protecting the integrity of the
progressive tax structure for two reasons. First, most taxpayers in the lowest tax
bracket claim the standard deduction, 225 and it is probable that even the phased
out itemized deduction is substantially greater than the standard deduction.
Second, wealthy taxpayers are fully able to claim above the line deductions such
as business deductions. Conversely, the phase-out of the personal exemption is
more successful in maintaining a progressive tax structure.
G. Proposed Tax Legislation's Increased Threat

The very partisan tax legislation enacted in recent years has resulted in
generous tax savings to the wealthy. Congress has also proposed legislation that
headed toward a weakening in the progressive tax structure. For example, during
the summer of 1999, Congress passed a ten year $792 billion tax cut. Included
in the package were reductions in the capital gain rates and increases of
contribution and annual limits on,RAs. Although Congress proposed a reduction
in all of the marginal rates, the package as a whole discriminated in favor of the
wealthy. The package was not discriminatory on its face, but its impact was
discriminatory because low-income taxpayers do not have sufficient disposable
income to make capital investments. As expected, President Clinton vetoed the
tax -cut package. 226 While Congress proposed additional tax breaks for the
wealthy, it also considered limiting the nonrefundable earned income tax credits

A. Fogarty, Juicy educational tax credits go unused: Some say code's too complex for students
to cash in, USA Today, Mar. 31,2000, at lB.
225. Most taxpayers in all tax brackets claim the standard deduction. For example,
for taxable year 1998 the IRS reported that only 30.5% of tax returns claimed itemized
deductions. See Tax Report, Wall St. J., July 5, 2000, at Al.
226. See Bob Davis & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Clinton Vetoes $792 Billion Tax Cut,
Seeks to Lure GOP Toward Compromise, Wall St. J., Sept. 24,1999, at A16.
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received by many low-income taxpayers. In the Congress's fiscal2000 budget,
House Republican leaders proposed converting the earned income credit
payments from lump sum to 12 installment payments as a way to raise $8.7
Eillion for labor, health and education programs. 227 The measure did not pass; 228
however, it exemplified the direction of the tax policy of the current Congress,
because it contemplated severely limiting benefits to the poor as a way to fund
appropriations.
Several Republican and Democratic Representatives also introduced the
"National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1999"229 and the "Fair Tax Act of 1999".230
Both bills propose the elimination of the Federal income tax and the imposition
of a consumption-type sales tax. On Apri115, 1999, several representatives
introduced the "National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1999" that would eliminate the
income tax and impose a 15% on consumptioQ231 On July 14, 1999,
Representative John Linder (R-GA) and Representative Collin Peterson (D-MN)
introduced the "Fair Tax Act of 1999" that also eliminates the current income tax
and replaces it with a 23% tax on consumption. 232 'The stated purpose of both
bills was "[t]o promote freedom, fairness, and economic opportunity forfamilies
by repealing the income tax, abolishing the Internal Revenue Service, and
enacting a national retail sales tax to be administered primarily by the States. " 233
Consistent with other election years, each candidate's platform usually
includes modifying the Code. Whether the tax platforms represent political
rhetoric or valid proposals, they play a significant role in enticing voters to vote
for a particular candidate. According to a poll conducted by the National
Republican Congressional Committee, 69% of 1000 voters in 41 contested
congressional districts indicated that they would vote for candidates who
supported the marriage penalty relief plan recently passed by the House. 234
Representative Charlie Stenholm, a conservative Democrat from Texas, stated
" [t]his is nothing more than a political document that is clearly an effort to push
a touchy-feely tax cut. " 235 Presidential candidates had proposed more aggressive
tax cuts than the tax package that was vetoed by former President ClintoQ

227. See David Rogers, Divided GOP Leans Toward Making Broad Spending Cuts
at Year's End, WallSt J., Oct.4, 1999, atA32.
228. See id.
229. H.R. 1467, 106th Cong. (1999).
230. H.R. 2525, 106th Cong. (1999).
231. H.R.1467, 106th Cong. (1999).
232. H.R. 2525, 106th Cong. (1999). Under the bill, the 23% figure is only in place
during the year 2001. After that year, the bill sets out a formula to determine the tax rate. See
id. § l01(b)(2) & (3).
233. See H.R. 2467,106th Cong. (1999) & H.R. 2525, 106th Cong. (1999).
234. See Jim VandeHei, House Passes GOP Marriage Tax -CutBill," Wall St J., Feb.
11,2000, atA16.
235. See id.
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Republican presidential candidate Gary Bauer proposed a 16% flat-tax on
individuals and corporations. 236 President George W. Bush proposed a $483
billion tax cut over a five-year period237 and now proposes a $1.6 trillion tax cut
over a ten year period. A significant component of President Bush's proposal
was the implementation of four flatter marginal rates ranging from 10% to 33%
replacing the current five marginal rates ranging from 15% to 39.6%. 238 For
single taxpayers, the 10% rate would apply to taxable income up to $6,000 and
for married taxpayers, the 10% rate would apply to the first $12,000. Under
President Bush's proposal, taxpayers currently taxed at the 36% and 39.6% rates
would be taxed at a 33% marginal rate. 239 Former presidential candidate Senator
John McCain of Arizona had proposed a $240 billion tax cut over a five-year
period that expands the 15% tax bracket to cover higher incomes. 2 4 Critics of
the proposal indicate that preliminary analysis of the proposal showed that
34.9% of the tax cuts would benefit taxpayers whose income was in the top 5%
and that only 6. 7% of the benefits would go to taxpayers in the bottom 60%
income level. 241 The same critics also pointed out that President Bush's proposal
would give 52.6% of the tax cuts to taxpayers in the top 5% level while 11%
would benefit taxpayers in the bottom 60% income leve1. 242 Former Democratic
candidate A1 Gore proposed a $500 billion tax cut over the next ten years. 243 Mr.
AI. Gore's plan was targeted toward the low-income and middle-income
taxpayers, and taxpayers earning more than $100,000 would see marginal tax
relief. 244 With the election finally decided, the debate shifts from election year
rhetoric to serious consideration of President Bush's tax plan. While it is unlikely
that the entire $1.6 trillion tax proposal will become law, it is probable Congress
will pass a substantial tax-cut during this year and enact some of the president's
$1.6 trillion tax cut plan. The endorsement of Alan Greenspan, the Federal
236. See Rogers, supra note 227, at A32. Under the proposal, all corporate deductions
would be disallowed. See id.
237. See Jackie Calmes, Bush's Tax-CutPlanFocuses on People at Bottom as Well
as Top, and Comes With Hugh Price Tag, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1999, at A28.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Richard W. Stevenson, McCain to Propose Middle-Class Tax Cut and Private
Accounts Within Social Security, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2000, at A21. Under Senator McCain's
proposal, up to $70,000 of taxable income for married couples filing joint returns and $35,000
for single taxpayers would be subject to the lowest tax bracket of 15%. Currently, the ceiling
for the 15% tax bracket is $36,900 for married couples filing joint returns and $22,100 for
single taxpayers. See IRC § 1(a) & (c).
241. See Stevenson, supra note 240, at A21.
242. Seeid.
243. See Richard W. Stevenson, Democrats Drawn to Tax Cuts, But Parties Still Split
Over Size, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2000, at Al.
244. See John D. McKinnon, Pocketbook Politics: How Plans would Affect You,
Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 2000, at Cl.
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Reserve Board's chairperson, to a tax cut increases the likelihood of tax relief.
The only significant issue remaining is whether the tax cut will safeguard the
progressive tax structure or whether it will continue the trend of eroding the
progressive tax structure.

245

IV. PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN TODAY'S SOCIETY
A The Renewed Need for Progressive Taxation

In a recent article, Professor Michael A Livingston stated that any
progressivity research should address topics such as impact of tax legislation and
tax rates on women and minority taxpayers. 246 Empirical data establishes that
many women and minorities are living below the poverty threshold. The poverty
threshold for a family of four was $16,660 in 1998.247 At that time, the poverty
rate was 12.7%, and the total number of families living below the poverty level
was 34.5 million. 248 Although the percentage of people living below the poverty
line is generally shrinking,249 the disparity between the wealthy and the poor has
steadily increased since 1967.
In 1998, households in the upper 95th percentile earned income 8.2 times
greater than those in the lowest 20th percentile compared to 6.3 in 1967.250 The
245. David E. Sanger, The President's Budget The Context; Surplus Feast: Will TaxCut Appetizer Leave Room for Debt-Slice Dessert?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2001, at A23. Mr.
Greenspan approves of a tax cut in principle, but he has not expressly endorsed President
Bush's $1.6 trillion tax cut. Id.
246. See Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kaven at 50: Progressive Taxation,
"Globalization," and the New Millennium, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 731, 737 (2000) [hereinafter
Livingston].
247. See Poverty, supra note 206, at 1.
248. Seeid.
249. The poverty rate increased in 1998 forresidents in the Northeast and West. See
id. at viii.
250. See Money, supra note 113, at vi, viii. Between 1967 and 1998, the disparity in
the household income between the highest and lowest income levels is as 'follows:
Upper 95%
Lowest 20%
Earned Income
Earned Income
Disparity
1998
$132,199
$16,116
8.20
1997
128,521
15,640
8.22
1996
124,187
15,342
8.09
1995
120,860
15,402
7.85
1990
118,163
15,589
7.58
1985
110,984
15,149
7.33
1980
101,999
14,965
6.82
1975
94,787
14,574
6.50
1970
91,477
14,552
6.29
1968
85,824
14,367
5.97
1967
85,317
13,471
6.33
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poverty level was substantially higher for several metropolitan areas and for
families headed by females. Females headed 53% of families living below the
poverty threshold, and the poverty rate for families headed by females was
29.9%. 252 The percentage of children under the age of six living below the
poverty level was 20.6%. 253 ,Q the case of children under the age of six residing
in households headed by females with no husband present, the poverty rate was
a staggering 54.8%. 254 The poverty level was also high for Blacks (26.1 %) and
for Hispanics (25.6%). 255 The median income was $25,351 for Blacks and
$28,330 for Hispanics. 256 This empirical data supports the longstanding trend
that females continue to earn substantially less than males. 257 The ratio of femaleto-male earnings for both high school graduates and college graduates is
approximately 71%. Significantly, 12.7 million households, 12% of all
households, were headed by females. 258 The median income of these households
was $24,393 compared to $38,885 for all households. 259
Many minorities and females represent the classic scenario set forth in
the introduction. When you consider the empirical data, the level of progressivity
necessary to promote a reasonable standard of living has far reaching
implications. While it is alarming that so many minorities, women and children
live far below the poverty threshold, our capitalistic society permits varied levels
of wealth resulting from competition in the free market. Whether the economic
advantages are earned by effective competition or inherited from a relative, our

251. For example, the poverty level in some major metropolitan areas was as follows:
Houston (28.1 %); New York City (24.3%), Washington, DC (23.8%); Los Angeles (22.5%);
Detroit (22.4%); Boston (22.1 %); Chicago (17.3%) and Dallas (17.1 %). See Nina Bernstein,
Poverty Rate Persists in City Despite Boom, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1999, at B 1.
252. See Poverty, supra note 206, at vi.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id. at viii.
256. See Money, supra note 113, at vi.
257. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the issues surrounding the gap
in earnings between males and females. See generally Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the
Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 707 (2000) (creation of wage equality is tied to
encouraging more men to take leave upon the birth of their children); Daniel R. Fischel &
Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
891 (1986) (arguing that comparable worth remedy is insufficient because it does not remove
barriers to entry in male-dominated jobs); see also Wynn R. Huang, Article: Gender
Differences in the Earnings of Lawyers, 30 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 267 (1997) (female
attorneys work in lower paying specialties and do not receive the same income premiums as
men); Lucy B. Bednarek, Note: The Gender Wage Gap: Searching for Equality in a Global
Economy, 6 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 213 (1998) (inequality in gender wages must be
addressed by considering effects of globalization);
258. See Money, supra note 113, at vi.
259. Seeid.
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system permits the unequal distribution of wealth. As a result, it would be
inconsistent with our capitalistic society to mandate a massive redistribution of
wealth under the Code. However, the country as a whole should share a role in
alleviating poverty, particularly with respect to children to at least prevent a
cycle of poverty from generation to generation The progressive tax structure
allows the low-income families to retain most of their income and prevents many
families' after-tax income from falling below the poverty level. There have not
been any radical changes in society altering this conclusion. The progressive tax
system remains viable even in today' s society. Hence, the tax system should not
be structured to allow for the wealthy taxpayers' after-tax income to increase
while taxpayers in every other income level experience a decrease in their aftertax income. Moreover, the tax system cannot be structured to allow the tax as a
percentage of adjusted gross income to decrease for the wealthiest taxpayers
while remaining proportionate for most taxpayers in other income brackets and
even increasing for some low-income taxpayers.
Part ,, of this article establishes that the progressive income tax structure
has permeated our tax system since the enactment of the Income Tax Act of
1913. Professor Livingston opined that changes in the modern world ''impose
significant practical obstacles to the maintenance of a progressive tax system". 260
Societal changes do not require a complete overhaul of our tax structure. Rather,
societal changes should only impact the level of progressivity. For example, to
combat the economic adversity surrounding the Great Depression, Congress
increased the surtax on the maximum marginal brackets from 20% to 55%.
Congress imposed the highest marginal rate of 91% during the World War IT.
Congress slowly reduced the astounding 91% rate, and the maximum marginal
rate is substantially lower today than it was when Professors Blum and Kalven
wrote their notable critique of the progressive tax system. It is inconceivable that
the rates would ever rise to the astronomical levels of yesteryear. Professor
Livingston correctly points out that there is an "increasing conservatism of
American politics. " 261 A more accurate question is whether progressive taxation
can be sustained at all in light of the increasing conservatism. Stated another
way, is the progressive tax structure inherent throughout history appropriate in
light of today's society? That question must be answered affirmatively.
Irrespective of the method of taxation adopted by this country, it cannot conflict
with the traditional ability-to-pay principles expressed in the legislative history
of the historic Income Tax Act of 1913. It is unlikely that Congress would enact
marginal rates approaching the rates in the past because of increased
conservatism. However, the progressive tax structure is the most effective
manner of satisfying revenue concerns while adhering to the ability-to-pay

260. See Livingston, supra note 246, at 737.
261. See id.
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concept The consumption tax favors the wealthy taxpayers that obviously are
in a better position to save large amounts of money over long periods of time.
Proportional taxation has several advantages, but is inappropriate to convert to
such a system of taxation because revenue shortfall considerations. Any viable
proposal for a proportional tax system would result in a tax increase for many
middle-income taxpayers to sustain the revenue demands. Of course,
progressivity would still be a part of proportional taxation in the form of
exemptions to prevent low-income taxpayers from being subjected to a hefty tax
burden.

B. Globalization and Progressive Taxation
Professor Livingston_argues that globalization precludes a country from
maintaining inflated tax rates because of a probable loss in business to competing
nations. 262 Arguably, developed countries might lose business to developing
countries due to lower wages in those developing countries, more costly
environmental controls and labor protection laws. ,I those developing countries
also maintain lower tax rates, that only represents one additional factor in
contributing to a loss in business to those countries. However, these countries
lack sufficient resources to pose bona fide threats to developed countries.
Moreover, many developing countries actually maintain progressive rate
structures. Taiwan's marginal rates for personal income ranges from 6% to
40%. " 263 Capital gains are taxed in the same manner. 264 1n Mexico, the marginal
rates range from 3% to 40%. 265 Capital gains are also subject to the Mexican
income tax. 266
A more significant question raised by Professor Livingston concerns
whether this country could lose business to developed countries. While Professor
Livingston was concerned with the competitive disadvantages a country might
encounter by maintaining high tax rates Ke was particularly apprehensive about
the impact on a country that taxed capital because of the ease of shifting capital
to countries with lower taxes. 267 Professor Livingston raises valid issues.
Nevertheless, many developed countries that possess sufficient resources to put
forth a serious competitive threat also maintain progressive rate structures, and
they also tax capital. Japan has been a leader in the manufacture of electronic

262. See id. at 742.
263. See 1998 International Tax Summaries: A Guide for Planning and Decisions
(Annual), at T-2 (Coopers & Lybrand ed.).
264. ld. at T-3.
265. See Nicasio del Castillo, Mauel F. Solano & Joseph M. Wolf, Business
Operations in Mexico, 972-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-65.
266. See id.
267. See Livingston, supra note 244, at 742.
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equipment and automobiles. In Japan, individuals are assessed a national income
tax. 268 The marginal tax rates are 10%, 20%, 30% and 37%.269 The tax is
impo ed on various fonns of income, including business income. 270 Generally,
Japan also imposes a local enterprise tax on business and rental income at a flat
rate of 5%. 271 In addition, Japan imposes a corporate .income tax at a 34.5% tax
rate for large corporations and 25% tax rate for small corporations. 272 Gains
from the disposition of corporate stock and other corporate securities are not
subject to the progressive ordinary income tax rates bot are subject to a flat tax
rate of 26%. 273 In Gennany, the graduated income tax rates range from 22.9%
to 51%. 274 Income derived from the investment of capital is also subject to
taxation but are no longer entitled to lower capital gain rates as had existed in the
past.275 Canada also has a system of progressive taxation. The three marginal
rates vary from 17% to 29%. 276 While the top marginal rate is substantially
lower than the maximum rate imposed under the Code, taxpayers are subject to
a surtax of 3%, and income exceeding $12,500 is subject to a surtax of 5%. 277
Income realized from capital ventures is also subject to capital gain taxation. 278
In Australia, the progressive rate schedule for the tax years 2000 through 2001
ranged from 0% for taxable income up to $6,000 to 47% for taxable income
above $60,000. 279 Capital a sets purchased after 1985 and held for over 12
months are subject to a capital gain tax rate that is 50% of the taxpayer's income
tax rate. 280 Hence, it is premature to emphasize globalization as a reason to lower
taxes because many countries' tax structures continue to tax capital and maintain
progressive income tax rates.

268. See Griffith Way, Rosser H. Brockman, Masatami Otsuka & Shimon Takagi,
Business Operations in Japan, 969 Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-136-37.
269. See id. atA-137.
270. See id. atA-140.
271. See id. at A-137.
272. See id. at A-30.
273. See id. atA-146.
274. See Juergen Killius, Business Operations in Germany, 962-2nd Tax Mgmt.
(BNA), at A-66.
275. See id. at A-60, A-64.
276. SeeRobertCouzin,Business Operations in Canada, 955-2nd TaxMgmt. (BNA),
atA-51.
277. See id.
278. See id. at A-45.
279. See Australian Taxation Office, Individual Resident Income Tax Rates, at
http://www.ato.gov.au (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
280. See id.
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C. Reduction in the Lowest Marginal Rate
Congressional members have the authority to detennine whether they
should enact legislation to adjust the rate structure as a result of economic or
social conditions affecting the country. However, there are several reasons why
any restructuring of the tax system should conform to the progressive tax
principle. IRS statistics establish that upper income taxpayers have been
retaining a larger share of their after-tax income than taxpayers in lower income
brackets. As a result, our tax system has become less progressive than it has been
in the past. It is likely that this pattern will continue based on the various
congressional tax proposals. Congress needs to improve its method of
distributing tax benefits and reapportioning the budget surplus. In reversing the
erosion of the progressive tax system, it is not necessary to limit the tax benefits
afforded to the wealthy, but tax benefits to the lower income taxpayer need to be
enhanced The use of deductions and nonrefundable credits is inadequate. In
order to balance the tax benefits allocated to the lower income taxpayers and the
upper income taxpayers, the lowest marginal rate should be reduced The
alternative approach of increasing the tax costs of the wealthy is less appealing.
The most equitable and simplest way to protect the progressive tax
structure is to lower the lowest marginal tax rate281 or to expand the 15% bracket
toincludehigherincomes. Presently, thelowestmarginalrateis 15%. Thelowest
marginal rate should be reduced to 10%.282 If a single taxpayer had taxable
income of $15,000, that taxpayer's tax would be $2,250 under the current
marginal rate structure. Alternatively, if Congress reduced the lowest marginal
rate to 10%, thattaxpayer's tax would be $1,500. This represents an annual tax
saving of $750. The tax liability is 33% lower than the liability under the current
rates. By comparison, if you assume that the single taxpayer reported taxable
income of $300,000, under the current rate structure the tax liability would equal
$99,572. If, however, the lowest income tax bracket were lowered to 10%, that
taxpayer tax liability would be $98,467. The integrity of the progressive tax
system would be protected as the higher income taxpayer's annual tax saving is
$1,105, but the tax liability is reduced by only 1%. If a taxpayer had $50,000 of
taxable income, the tax liability under the current scheme would equal $11,127.
Alternatively, under the proposed scheme, the tax liability would equal $10,022.
The taxpayer's liability is reduced by 10%. Consequently, the higher income

281. SeeBankman &Griffith, supranote44, at 1905,1945 (stating that"progressive
tax is best implemented through declining marginal rates rather than through increasing
marginal rates").
282. President George W. Bush' s plan includes a reduction in the lowest rate to 10%,
but the income ceilings are $6,000 for single taxpayers and $12,000 for married taxpayers
fllingjointreturns. See Pocketbook Politics: How Tax Plans Would Mfect You, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 4, 2000, at Cl, C21.
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taxpayer will receive an annual tax savings in the same amount as any taxpayer
with taxable income of at least $22,100, but the percentage of tax savings is
higher for lower income taxpayers.
D. Viability of Proposal
Professor Graetz has stated that five principles must be addressed to
establish whether a particular tax is viable: Whether the tax is fair, easy to
comply with and administer, conducive to economic growth, produce adequate
revenue and provide little interference with private economic decisions. 283 In
detennining whether the proposal to alter the income tax rates is viable, these five
principles will be addressed.

l.TheFairnessoftheReductionoftheLowestMarginalTaxRate.-As

already noted in this article, there is no consistent interpretation of fairness under
the tax statute. While an amendment to the income tax laws may be considered
fair to one individual, it also may be considered to be a most inequitable
amendment to another individual. Any amendment of a tax statute that increases
the tax burden of the wealthy in order to reverse the erosion of the progressive
tax system would raise issues of fairness. Furthermore, it would provide no
tangible tax benefit to the lower income taxpayers. Alternatively, if Congress
expanded the earned income tax credit to make it more inclusive, it would not
survive the inevitable criticism that it went beyond its intended purpose and
unfairly reallocated wealth. A more practical approach of increasing
progressivity is to either lower the lowest marginal bracket or to increase the
lowest marginal tax bracket to include more lower to middle income taxpayers.
While an expansion of the lowest marginal bracket to include a larger amount of
taxable income would provide a substantial tax savings to many lower to middle
class taxpayers, it would also provide a minimum benefit to upper income
taxpayers by a slight reduction in their effective tax rates. The major concern
with this proposal is that it would not provide any benefit to low-income
283. See Graetz, supra note 22, at 10. It is difficult to conceive a tax system that is
fair but does not conflict with the other 4 tax principles. As Professor Graetz points out:
[b]oth economic efficiency and equity generally support uniform income tax
treatment of sources and uses of income. In other circumstances, however, equity and
efficiency conflict. For example, tax fairness might support taxing all sources of
income when economic efficiency argues for taxing consumption or wages.
Likewise, the disincentives for earning income may be greater under a progressive
rate structure that applies higher rates to greater amounts of income, but a society's
sense of tax justice may demand such progressivity.
See id. at 12; see also Paul, supra note 33, at 151, 155 ("[c]omplexity is a by-product of a tax
regime's reconciliation of the lofty aspiration to distribute tax burdens equitably and the
mundane requirement that the tax be susceptible to administration and compliance.").
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taxpayers. This is particularly problematic for the category of low-income
taxpayers that are unable to take advantage of the earned income tax credit.
Hence, while the increase in the 15% bracket has its advantages, it is not entirely
equitable because it prevents a small class of taxpayers from sharing in the
benefits. Some scholars might criticize this proposal because the wealthy
taxpayers would actually receive a larger annual tax savings than their lower
income counterparts. However, the proposal is not intended to reallocate wealth;
rather, it is intended to ensure that the percentage of tax savings is higher for the
lower income taxpayer t h a n the higher income taxpayer.
Conversely, a reduction of the lowest progressive rate would benefit
taxpayers in every income bracket. In reversing the past erosion of the
progressive tax system, every taxpayer, irrespective of the taxable income, will
enjoy the tax benefits by sharing in the tax cut.
2. Simplicity and Compliance.-During 1989, former Representative
and House Ways and Means Committee member Barber Conable reflected on his
days in Congress and causal forces behind the Code's complexity. 284 He coined
the phrase "ABC syndrome" to explain the complexity underlying the tax code. 285
Based on his experience, the ABC syndrome unfolds upon the enactment of a tax
provision and the subsequent interaction with constituents complaining about the
inequitable impact of the provision. The constituent states " [w ]hat you have done
in the tax system is fundamentally all right, but I have a very unusual situation,
you see, and it is not fair for me to have to be taxed this way just because my
neighbor thinks it is all right. " 286 Upon reflection, members of the House Ways
and Means Committee are persuaded that an exception should be created for all
A's who qualify. 287 Subsequently, another constituent, B, approaches a
congressional member and expresses concern about the adverse effect of the
exception created for A 288 In recognizing the inequity impacting B and those
similarly situated, another exception is created. 289 The phenomenon continues and
eventually spirals into tax complexity. 290

284. See Conable, supra note 78, at 38.
285. See id. at 40-41.
286. See id. at 41.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. Another factor contributing to complexity in the tax statute is Congress's
promotion of social policy. Many tax experts believe that the promotion of social policy
thwarts the objective of raising revenue and has made the Code inordinately complex. See, e.g.,
Sheldon D. Pollack, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy: Revenue and Politics 243 (1996); Stanley
S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970)

2001]

The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code

45

Some scholars have argued that the very nature of progressive taxes
complicate the tax system and encourage tax avoidance. 291 Concededly, the
progressive tax system is inordinately complex; 292 however, it does not follow
that every amendment will be difficult to administer. One advantage to a tax cut
in the form of a rate reduction or an increase in the 15% tax bracket is tax
simplification. It would be easy to administer, and Congress would circumvent
the "ABC syndrome". It is much more practical to reduce taxes by lowering the
tax rates rather than enacting additional deductions, exclusions and credits. By
simply lowering the marginal bracket, Congress is able to cut taxes without the
necessity of a complex set of instructions, schedules and regulations.
3. Economic Growth.-One of the criticisms of a progressive tax system
is that it results in a disincentive for taxpayers to maximize their income
opportunities. 293 If the highest marginal rates are increased, an argument could
be made that it impedes income generation and economic growth. The argument
revolves around a purported disincentive for taxpayers to increase their earnings
because of the graduated tax rates. While this argument is worthy of
consideration, the empirical data does not lend support to this theory. 294
4. Production ofRevenue.-Ifrevenueproducti.on were irrelevant, equity
and efficiency would result in the repeal of all taxes. 295 However, the primary
purpose of the income tax is to generate income for government operations. The
lowering of the bottom tax bracket is not cost prohibitive. Based on the IRS
statistics from 1997, the projected annual cost of the rate reduction would be
approximately $36 billion per year. 296

291. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 25, at 14.
292. This article is not intended to provide a recommendation as to how the tax
statute could be reformed to make it simpler. Professor Jonathan Barry Forman conducted an
in-depth project on how the taxing statute could be revamped to simplify it for low-income
taxpayers. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpayers: Some
Options, 57 Ohio St. L. J. 145 (1996). Professor Forman stated that it might not be possible to
for all taxpayers, but it was possible to simplify the taxing scheme for low-income taxpayers
and outlined several proposals to carry out that objective.
293. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 25, at 21.
294. For example, after Congress increased the graduated rates during 1993, adjusted
gross income for individuals earning $1,000,000 or more increased each year after the
amendment. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
295. See Kwall, supra note 144, at 633-34.
296. During taxable year 1997, the income tax after nonrefundable credits totaled
$729 billion. See Internal Revenue Service, 19 Stat of Income Bull., Selected Historical &
Other Data, at 194 (Summer 1999). Upon reducing the lowest marginal rate by 5%, the income
tax would total $693 billion.
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With a projected surplus of $1.9 trillion for the next ten years,
implementation of the proposal would have little impact. Moreover, the projected
cost of implementation is substantially less than the projected $1.6 trillion tax cut
proposed by President Bush.
5. Interference with Private Economic Decisions .-The Code is replete
with numerous provisions designed to encourage desired behavior. 297 It is,
therefore, difficult to enact tax provisions that do not interfere with private
economic decisions. However, the lowering of the bottom tax bracket or
expansion of the bottom tax bracket would not interfere with private economic
decisions.

V. CONCLUSION
When the historic Income Tax Act of 1913 was enacted, Congress
implemented a progressive tax structure. The fundamental principle underlining
the progressive tax structure is that responsibility for the federal tax burden
should be based on an ability-to-pay concept. That principle has continued
vitality today. There is considerable evidence establishing that Congress has been
eroding the progressive tax structure. This is particularly apparent between the
lower to middle income level taxpayers and upper income taxpayers. It is
probable that Congress has protected some progressivity between the middle to
upper income taxpayers and the wealthiest taxpayers. The middle to upper
income taxpayers are readily able to benefit from the numerous tax cuts enacted
during the 1990's such as Roth IRAs, educational IRAs, Hope and Lifetime
Learning Credits and student loan interest deduction.
The current system fails because it does not adhere to the ability-to-pay
principle because many taxpayers' after tax income leaves them with incomes
below the poverty level. For taxpayers that do not qualify for the earned income
tax credit, they will be able to retain a greater portion of their income that will
enable them to move closer to the poverty level. Taxpayers that are in the lower
to middle income level who have been unable to share in recent tax cuts
undoubtedly will be able to benefit under this proposal.
The proposals submitted by both the frontrunners in the recent
presidential election failed to satisfy the concept offaimess. President George W.
Bush's proposal was unfair because he targeted the wealthy taxpayers. Former
Vice-President Gore's proposal was equally unfair because he targeted the low-

297. See, e.g., IRC § l(h) (favorable capital gain rates designed to encourage longterm investments); ld. § 163(h)(l) & (2) (mortgage interest deductible which effectively
encourages homeownership over renting), id. § 170 (charitable contribution deduction provides
an incentive for charitable giving).
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income and middle-income taxpayers. The proposal to reduce the lowest tax rate
is fair because most taxpayers will be able to share in the tax cut. In addition,
one of the most important aspects of the proposal is that it is consistent with the
progressive tax structure that is inherent in the Code.

